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I.

Introduction

Eavesdropping on private conversations has occurred since
time immemorial. At common law this practice was considered
a nuisance punishable as a crime.1 Along with the development
of electricity and the telegraph, the secret interception of
private electronic messages began.2 States recognized early on
the danger to individual privacy accompanying the ability to
surreptitiously listen to private telegraph and telephone
messages. As early as the turn of the Twentieth Century,
states such as Illinois and California prohibited the use of
wiretaps.3 In addition to these privacy concerns, however, lawenforcement agencies were also quick to recognize the
advantages of being able to covertly listen to a private
conversation. During the era of Prohibition, for example,
* Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, LLP; J.D., summa cum laude, Seton
Hall University School of Law; B.S., Union College.
1. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *169. Although at
common law a nuisance was generally punishable as a criminal offense, today
it is generally considered a tort. See, e.g., In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d
484, 495 (N.J. 2007) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. b
(1979)).
2. See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 45-47 (1967) (recounting
the early history of eavesdropping laws).
3. See id. at 46.
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“wiretaps were the principal source of information relied upon
by the police as the basis for prosecutions.”4 The use of
wiretaps remains prevalent today. It continues to be one of the
most important law enforcement tools available and one of the
most persuasive pieces of evidence that can be presented to a
jury. Indeed, as the world has become more “connected” with
emerging technology, the prevalence of wiretap use in criminal
investigations has increased. The reported number of
authorized wiretap applications has grown by a total of sixtyone percent from 2001 through 2011.5
The expanded use of wiretaps presents troubling questions
for courts and litigants. Although wiretaps are generally
subject to challenges under the Fourth Amendment, the
modern use of wiretaps has been defined largely by statute.
Following several developments in the area of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, Congress enacted the Wiretap Act
of 1968, which was passed as Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (“Title III” or “Title III of
the Crime Control Act”).6 The purpose of Title III was to
balance properly the competing law enforcement and privacy
interests inherent in the government’s covert interception of
personal conversations.7 In order to preserve individual
privacy, Congress enacted several statutory protections meant

4. Id.
5. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, APPLICATIONS FOR ORDERS
AUTHORIZING OR APPROVING THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE, ORAL, OR ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS
10
(June
2012),
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/WiretapReports/2011/2011WireT
ap.pdf [hereinafter 2011 WIRETAP REPORT]. This, however, may also be due in
part to federal and state officials’ increased awareness of reporting
requirements. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, APPLICATIONS FOR
ORDERS AUTHORIZING OR APPROVING THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE, ORAL, OR
ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS
7
(June
2011),
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/WiretapReports/2010/2010WireT
apReport.pdf [hereinafter 2010 WIRETAP REPORT] (noting that the thirty-four
percent increase in reported wiretaps between 2009 and 2010 was “due, at
least in part, to enhanced [Administrative Office of the United States Courts’]
efforts to ensure that federal and state authorities were aware of their
reporting responsibilities under 18 U.S.C. § 2519”).
6. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets (Wiretap) Act of 1968, Pub.
L. No. 90-351, tit. III, §§ 801-802, 82 Stat. 197, 211-23 (1968) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2012)).
7. See id.§ 801(b), 82 Stat. at 211.
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to avoid government investigators resorting to wiretap use as a
matter of course. Two of the most important requirements
mandate that a wiretap may be used only where the
government is investigating a specific enumerated offense
found in Title III and that the government may use a wiretap
only where it is “necessary” to advance a criminal
investigation.8 As several recent white-collar prosecutions
indicate, both of these requirements have been weakened by
the courts.9 In turn, this development threatens the balance of
interests that Congress sought to achieve in enacting Title
III.10
Starting in the late 1960s, Congress directed that wiretaps
could be authorized for use only where government officials are
investigating certain enumerated offenses specifically listed in
Title III.11 Most pervasively, wiretaps have been permitted for
use by government officials in investigating organized drugtrafficking schemes. For example, in 2011, narcotics
investigations accounted for over eighty-five percent of all
court-authorized electronic intercepts.12 Recently, however,
federal authorities have been able to obtain convictions for
white-collar crimes beyond those enumerated in Title III based,
in part, on the use of wiretap evidence.13 Over the past several
years in the Southern District of New York, more than 65
people have been convicted of insider trading either through
plea agreement or jury verdict.14 Of the eight cases to go to

8. See discussion infra Parts III.B.1., III.B.3.
9. See id.
10. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
11. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets (Wiretap) Act of 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 216-17 (1968) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2012)).
12. 2011 WIRETAP REPORT, supra note 5, at 16 tbl.3 (a total of 2,334 out
of 2,732 wiretaps warrants were granted to investigate narcotics offenses).
13. See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, The Winning Record of Prosecutors of
Insider Trading, N.Y TIMES DEALBOOK (Aug. 21, 2012, 11:49 AM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/21/the-winning-record-of-prosecutors-ofinsider-trading/ (discussing recent cases).
14. Walter Pavlo, Doug Whitman Guilty of Insider Trading, FORBES,
(Aug.
20,
2012,
1:49
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/walterpavlo/2012/08/20/doug-whitman-guilty-ofinsider-trading/.
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trial, the government has a perfect conviction rate.15 In the
most high-profile of these cases, the prosecution of Raj
Rajaratnam, founder of the Galleon Group hedge fund, federal
prosecutors relied heavily on the use of wiretaps.16 The
Galleon-related cases mark “the first time that courtauthorized wiretaps have been used to target significant
insider trading on Wall Street.”17 This development sent shockwaves through the world of finance; the change in investigative
technique signaled by these cases has alternatively been
described as “seismic,”18 “dramatic,”19 and a “landmark.”20
Preet Bharara, the United States Attorney for the Southern
District of New York, summed up the anxiety felt on Wall
Street when announcing the arrest of several insider-trading
defendants: “Today, tomorrow, next week, the week after,
privileged Wall Street insiders who are considering breaking
the law will have to ask themselves one important question: Is
law enforcement listening?”21
In addition to the expanded use of wiretaps during the
investigation of crimes not specifically enumerated under Title
III, courts have also been weakening other statutory
15. Henning, supra note 13.
16. See United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH), 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010), aff’d, 719 F.3d 139 (2d
Cir. 2013).
17. Preet Bharara, U.S. Attorney for the S. Dist. of N.Y., Prepared
Remarks for U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara: U.S. v. Raj Rajaratnam, et al.;
U.S. v. Dainielle [sic] Chiesi, et al., Hedge Fund Insider Trading Takedown 2
(Oct.
16,
2009),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/hedgefund/hedgefundinsidertradingremarks1
01609.pdf.
18. See Stephen A. Miller, Will There be a ‘CSI Effect’ for Wiretapping?,
L.
TECH.
NEWS
(ONLINE)
(May
23,
2011),
http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=120249477
3565&Will_There_Be_a_CSI_Effect_for_Wiretapping&slreturn=20120722144
320.
19. See White Collar Crime, Blue Collar Tactics: A Defense Lawyer’s
Perspective,
BAKER
BOTTS,
http://www.bakerbotts.com/infocenter/publications/detail.aspx?id=037e2b4e0948-44d4-8159-129d0e61c018 (last visited July 13, 2013).
20. See Patricia Hurtado, FBI Pulls Off ‘Perfect Hedge’ to Nab New
Insider Trading Class, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 20, 2011, 12:00 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-20/fbi-pulls-off-perfect-hedge-tonab-new-insider-trading-class.html.
21. See Bharara, supra note 17, at 2.
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requirements. Congress sought to limit the increasing use of
wiretaps by, inter alia, limiting their application to cases where
resorting to this invasive technique is considered “necessary.”22
In order to establish the required “necessity” during the
warrant application process, a government official applying for
a wiretap warrant must provide “a full and complete
statement” of those facts surrounding the investigation and
why the government has been unsuccessful in its investigation,
or why it would likely be unsuccessful if alternative techniques
were tried.23 A recent trend has emerged, however, wherein
courts analyzing a suppression motion have applied the
constitutional standard of Franks v. Delaware24 to the
statutorily-based necessity requirement.25 This has permitted
the government to, in effect, obtain a wiretap warrant without
the appropriate judicial pre-screening as mandated by Title III.
In turn, this is likely to increase the use of wiretaps as an
investigative technique because a wiretap applicant may now
obtain a warrant based upon faulty information and justify its
“necessity” after the fact.
With the expanded use of wiretaps, courts will be faced in
the coming years with questions concerning the contours of
statutory authorization and the consequences of this expanded
use into areas not traditionally associated with wiretap
evidence. This is especially true in light of the fact that the
United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has already
promised that its use of wiretaps will “‘continue to go up
dramatically.’”26 This Article attempts to highlight some of the
consequences of failing to strictly adhere to the statutory
requirements of Title III, most importantly the predicate

22. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (2012).
23. Id.
24. 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Shryock, 342 F.3d 948, 977 (9th Cir. 2003);
United States v. Green, 175 F.3d 822, 828 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Guerra-Marez, 928 F.2d 665, 670-71 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Cole,
807 F.2d 262, 267-68 (1st Cir. 1986); United States v. Ippolito, 774 F.2d 1482,
1484-85 (9th Cir. 1985).
26. See Hilary Russ, DOJ Promises More Wiretaps in White Collar Cases,
LAW360.COM
(Nov.
4,
2010,
3:24
PM),
http://www.law360.com/topnews/articles/206673/doj-promises-morewiretapsin-white-collar-cases.
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offense and necessity requirements. It then suggests several
ways to rebalance privacy interests in the larger context of
wiretap use. Part II of this article will provide a brief history of
wiretap jurisprudence leading up to the passage of Title III of
the Crime Control Act in 1968.27 Part III will provide an
overview of the current statutory scheme applicable to the use
of wiretaps.28 Part IV will examine several recent trends in
which wiretap evidence was used to obtain convictions for
crimes not specifically listed in Title III and in which courts
have adopted a constitutional analysis in determining whether
evidence should be suppressed for a violation of the statutorybased necessity requirement.29 Finally, Part V will discuss
several alternative approaches courts could adopt in enforcing
the strictures of Title III in order to more appropriately balance
privacy interests as Congress originally intended.30
II. The History of Wiretap Jurisprudence Leading up to Title
III of the Crime Control Act
The use of wiretaps extends as far back as the beginning of
the Twentieth Century, and possibly even as far back as the
late Nineteenth Century.31 It was not until 1928, in Olmstead
v. United States,32 that the Supreme Court first visited the use
of wiretaps in criminal prosecutions.33 At the time Olmstead
was decided, the Fourth Amendment was interpreted to protect
against unwarranted trespass of a man’s house, his person, his
papers and his effects—i.e., it protected material things.34 In
Olmstead, the Court concluded that admitting into evidence
information obtained by wiretap did not violate the Fourth

27. See discussion infra Part II.
28. See discussion infra Part III.
29. See discussion infra Part IV.
30. See discussion infra Part V.
31. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 45-50 (1967) (recounting the
early history of eavesdropping laws).
32. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
33. See Berger, 388 U.S. at 50.
34. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464.
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Amendment.35 In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned
that telegraph and telephone messages were different in kind
than those instrumentalities that were traditionally protected
by the Fourth Amendment.36
For the next thirty years, constitutional considerations
played no role in determining whether the use of wiretap
evidence was permitted in the prosecution of criminal
defendants. In 1967, however, Olmstead was overruled by
Berger v. New York37 and Katz v. United States.38 These cases
shifted the paradigm of Fourth Amendment protection from
one based on notions of physical invasion to one based on
expectations of privacy.39 In Berger, the Court held for the first
time that the Fourth Amendment was applicable when
challenging the use of wiretaps in criminal prosecutions.40
More specifically, the Berger court concluded that a New York
statute authorizing the issuance of a wiretap warrant was
facially unconstitutional because it authorized eavesdropping
“without requiring belief that any particular offense has been
or is being committed,” and because it did not contain a
particularity requirement.41 The Court recognized that “[b]y its
very nature eavesdropping involves an intrusion on privacy
that is broad in scope,”42 and that “[f]ew threats to liberty exist
which are greater than that posed by the use of eavesdropping

35. Id. at 466.
36. See id. at 464-65.
37. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
38. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
39. In Katz, the Court concluded that “the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places.” Id. at 351. As such, “what he [or she] seeks to preserve as
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.” Id. at 351-52 (citing Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960); Ex
parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877)).
40. See Berger, 388 U.S. at 53-58.
41. Id. at 58-59. The particularity requirement stems from the Fourth
Amendment’s command that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV
(emphasis added). “In the wiretap context, [the Fourth Amendment’s
particularity] requirements are satisfied by identification of the telephone
line to be tapped and the particular conversations to be seized.” United States
v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 427 n.15 (1977).
42. Berger, 388 U.S. at 56.
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devices.”43
During the thirty-year period between Olmstead and
Berger, the statutory landscape regulating the use of wiretap
evidence began to take shape. Despite rejecting any
constitutional challenge to their use, Olmstead marked a larger
shift in the use of wiretaps in criminal prosecutions by issuing
a call to arms for Congress to act.44 The Olmstead Court stated:
“Congress may of course protect the secrecy of telephone
messages by making them, when intercepted, inadmissible in
evidence in federal criminal trials, by direct legislation, and
thus depart from the common law of evidence.”45
Congress responded in 1934 by passing what became
section 605 of the Federal Communications Act (FCA).46
Section 605, as originally enacted, provided in relevant part:
No person receiving or assisting in receiving, or
transmitting, or assisting in transmitting, any
interstate or foreign communication by wire or
radio shall divulge or publish the existence,
contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning
thereof, except through authorized channels of
transmission or reception, to any person other
than the addressee, his agent, or attorney, . . . in
response to a subpoena [sic] issued by a court of
competent jurisdiction, or on demand of other
lawful authority.47

43. Id. at 63.
44. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J.,
concurring) (“In an ironic sense, although Katz overruled Olmstead, Chief
Justice Taft’s suggestion in the latter case that the regulation of wiretapping
was a matter better left for Congress has been borne out.” (internal citation
omitted)).
45. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465-66 (1928), overruled by
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S.
41 (1967).
46. Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 605, 48 Stat. 1064, 1103-04 (1934) (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2012)); see also Berger, 388 U.S at 51 (“Congress
soon thereafter, and some say in answer to Olmstead, specifically prohibited
the interception without authorization and the divulging or publishing of the
contents of telephonic communications.”).
47. § 605, 48 Stat. at 1103.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/7

8

1154

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:3

In its first landmark case addressing this statute, Nardone
v. United States (“Nardone I”),48 the Supreme Court interpreted
the term “any person” to include federal authorities; the Court
refused to read into the statute an implied exception for federal
officers who obtained wiretap evidence in violation of the
statute.49 The Court read section 605 in accordance with its
plain meaning such that it prohibited “anyone, unless
authorized by the sender, to intercept a telephone message,
and directs in equally clear language that ‘no person’ shall
divulge or publish the message or its substance to ‘any
person.’”50 Moreover, the Court concluded that “[t]o recite the
contents of the message in testimony before a court is to
divulge the message.”51 Thus, federal prosecutors could not use
wiretap evidence obtained in violation of section 605 in a
criminal prosecution because Congress had specifically
prohibited it.52 When the defendant in Nardone I again worked
his way back to the Supreme Court two years later, the Court
held that section 605 barred not only the use of evidence
obtained in violation of the FCA, but that it also barred the
“fruits” derived from that evidence from being admitted.53
Over the next three decades, section 605 played a central
role in determining the admissibility of wiretap evidence in the
federal courts. Numerous cases over this period addressed the
reach and meaning of the statute. First, in Weiss v. United
States,54 the Court concluded that section 605 applied to both
interstate and wholly-intrastate communications.55 Three years
later, the Court held that only a party to the recorded
conversation had standing to object to its use in evidence.56 In
Schwartz v. Texas,57 the Court held “that § 605 applies only to
the exclusion in federal court proceedings of evidence obtained
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
(1939).
54.
55.
56.
57.

Nardone v. United States (Nardone I), 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
See id. at 382-84.
Id. at 382.
Id.
See id. at 383-85.
See Nardone v. United States (Nardone II), 308 U.S. 338, 340-41
308 U.S. 321 (1939).
See id. at 329.
See Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 121-22 (1942).
344 U.S. 199 (1952).
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and sought to be divulged in violation thereof; it does not
exclude such evidence in state court proceedings.”58 Schwartz
treated section 605 as simply a “rule of evidence,” and reasoned
that Congress did not unequivocally declare its intent to
preempt state law in this area.59 The Court continued to treat
section 605 as a rule of evidence in Benanti v. United States.60
There, the Court determined that evidence unlawfully obtained
in violation of section 605 was inadmissible in federal court
despite the fact that it was obtained by state officials.61 In the
same year Benanti was decided, the Court also held that no
violation of the statute occurred where police had listened to a
conversation with the permission of one of the parties.62
Finally, in 1968, the year after the Court refocused its Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence on the notion of privacy, the Court
decided Lee v. Florida.63 In Lee, the Court overruled its
previous decision in Schwartz and held that section 605
rendered inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of the
FCA in state court prosecutions.64
In response to the Court’s decisions in Berger and Katz65—

58. Id. at 203.
59. Id.
60. 355 U.S. 96, 100 (1957).
61. See id. at 100 (“[E]vidence obtained by means forbidden by Section
605, whether by state or federal agents, is inadmissible in federal court.”).
62. See Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107, 108, 111 (1957).
63. 392 U.S. 378 (1968).
64. See id. at 385-87. The Court reasoned that Schwartz was decided “in
the shadow of Wolf v. People of State of Colorado.” Lee, 392 U.S. at 383
(citation omitted). The Court in Wolf held that “in a prosecution in a State
court for a State crime the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the
admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure.” Wolf
v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961). The Mapp Court held that evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, was inadmissible in a state court prosecution. See Mapp, 367
U.S. at 655. The Court in Lee thus subsequently concluded that “[i]n view of
the Nardone and Benanti decisions, the doctrine of Schwartz v. State of Texas
cannot survive the demise of Wolf v. People of the State of Colorado.” Lee, 392
U.S. at 385.
65. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J.,
concurring) (characterizing Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 as a response the Supreme Court’s decision in Katz); see
also Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 849
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and just two days after the Court handed down its decision in
Lee—Congress ushered in a new era for the use of wiretaps in
criminal prosecutions by passing Title III of the Crime Control
Act.66 Title III, among other things, rewrote section 605 to
apply principally to communication personnel,67 and it set forth
a separate regime for authorizing wiretaps by law enforcement
authorities.68
III. Title III: The Current Statutory Scheme
In passing Title III Congress intended “to protect
effectively the privacy of wire and oral communications, to
protect the integrity of court and administrative proceedings,
and to prevent the obstruction of interstate commerce.”69

(2004) (arguing that the decisions in Berger and Katz, a wiretap and a
bugging case respectively, “were carefully timed to influence the shape of
statutory law”).
66. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets (Wiretap) Act of 1968, Pub.
L. No. 90-351, tit. III, §§ 801-802, 82 Stat. 197, 211-23 (1968) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2012)).
67. See id. § 803, 82 Stat. at 223-25 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §
605 (2012)).
68. See id. § 802, 82 Stat. at 212-23 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§
2510-22 (2012)).
69. See id. § 801(b), 82 Stat. at 211; see also Gelbard v. United States,
408 U.S. 41, 48-49 (1972). The court noted that:
The Senate committee report that accompanied Title III
underscores the congressional policy: ‘Title III has as it [sic]
dual purpose (1) protecting the privacy of wire and oral
communications, and (2) delineating on a uniform basis the
circumstances and conditions under which the interception
of wire and oral communications may be authorized. To
assure the privacy of oral and wire communications, title III
prohibits all wiretapping and electronic surveillance by
persons other than duly authorized law enforcement officers
engaged in the investigation or prevention of specified types
of serious crimes, and only after authorization of a court
order obtained after a showing and finding of probable
cause.’ Hence, although Title III authorizes invasions of
individual privacy under certain circumstances, the
protection of privacy was an overriding congressional
concern.
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Congress achieved these goals by (i) “defin[ing] on a uniform
basis the circumstances and conditions under which the
interception of wire and oral communications may be
authorized”; (ii) by “prohibit[ing] any unauthorized interception
of such communications”; and (iii) by regulating “the use of the
contents thereof in evidence in courts and administrative
proceedings.”70 In the years since 1968, Title III has been
amended numerous times.71
In its current iteration, Title III broadly prohibits the
interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic
communications,72 and it makes doing so a crime punishable by
a fine, a term of imprisonment, or both.73 In addition, Title III
prohibits the use of wiretap evidence in any judicial,
administrative, regulatory, and other similar proceeding if the
communication was obtained in violation of federal law.74 Title
III, however, does not entirely prohibit the use of wiretaps by
law enforcement. Instead, Title III sets forth a comprehensive
scheme that government officials must follow in order to secure
an electronic surveillance order.75
A. What Constitutes a Wiretap Under Title III
The term “wiretap” is not used in Title III to describe the
use of electronic eavesdropping devices.76 Rather, the scope of
Title III is defined in terms of the type communication at issue,
whether information from this protected communication is
obtained or used by a third party, and the manner in which
information from a protected communication is obtained.77 In
common usage, the term “wiretapping” is thought to be
“confined to the interception of communication by telephone

Id. (internal citation omitted).
70. See § 801(b), 82 Stat. at 211.
71. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2012) (amended in 1970, 1978, 1984,
1986, 1994, 1994, 1996, 2001, 2002, 2008, 2008).
72. See id. § 2511(1); see also Gelbard, 408 U.S. at 46.
73. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4)(a).
74. See id. § 2515.
75. See id. § 2518(1).
76. See generally id. §§ 2510-2522.
77. See id.
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and telegraph and generally may be performed from outside
the premises to be monitored.”78 This is in contrast to
“bugging,” which generally refers to “the interception of all oral
communications in a given location” and is typically
“accomplished by installation of a small microphone in the
room to be bugged and transmission to some nearby receiver.”79
Title III regulates both wiretapping and bugging by prohibiting
the “interception” and “disclosure” of “wire, oral, or electronic
communications.”80
1. Protected Communications
In order to fall under the purview of Title III, the
communication at issue must be a protected communication.
There are three different categories of communications
protected against unlawful interference: wire communications,
oral communications, and electronic communications.81 The
statutory definitions provided for the types of communications
regulated under Title III are broad in scope.
A “wire communication” is expansively defined under Title
III as:
[A]ny aural transfer made in whole or in part
through the use of facilities for the transmission
of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or
other like connection between the point of origin
and the point of reception (including the use of
such connection in a switching station) furnished
or operated by any person engaged in providing
or operating such facilities for the transmission
of interstate or foreign communications or
communications affecting interstate or foreign
commerce.82

78. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 240 n.1 (1979) (citation
omitted).
79. Id. (citations omitted).
80. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511.
81. See generally id. § 2510.
82. See id.
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This definition includes spoken communication made over both
land-based phone lines and cell phones.83 Importantly,
however, a “wire communication” is limited to only the “aural
acquisition” of information, which “literally translated mean[s]
to come into possession through the sense of hearing.”84
Therefore, information, such as the numbers dialed, that is
transmitted via cell phone, other than the voices of the phone
call participants, does not fall within the purview of Title III.85
Rather, the numbers dialed, signaling information, and many
other similar types of non-aural information transmitted via
cell phone are governed by the Pen Register and Trap and
Trace Statute (“Pen Register Act”).86
In contrast to a wire communication, “an oral
communication is one carried by sound waves, not by an
electronic medium.”87 Under Title III, “oral communication” is
defined as “any oral communication uttered by a person
exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not
83. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 524 & n.7 (2001) (citing Nix v.
O’Malley, 160 F.3d 343, 346 (6th Cir. 1998); McKamey v. Roach, 55 F.3d
1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 1995)); see also In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing
Roving Interception of Oral Communications, 349 F.3d 1132, 1138 n.12 (9th
Cir. 2003) (“Despite the apparent wireless nature of cellular phones,
communications using cellular phones are considered wire communications
under the statute, because cellular telephones use wire and cable connections
when connecting calls.” (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1); S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 11
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3565; H. Rep. No. 99-647, at 31
(1986); Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 524)). Telephone intercepts accounted for
ninety-six percent of all intercepts installed by government investigators in
2011, and the majority of these intercepts involved cellular phones. See 2011
WIRETAP REPORT, supra note 5, at 9.
84. Smith v. Wunker, 356 F. Supp. 44, 46 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (citation
omitted); cf. United States v. Larios, 593 F.3d 82, 90 (1st Cir. 2010) (“Every
circuit court to address the issue has concluded that Title III does not
regulate silent video surveillance.”) (emphasis added) (collecting cases).
85. See, e.g., United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 166
(1977) (“Both the language of the statute and its legislative history establish
beyond any doubt that pen registers are not governed by Title III.”).
86. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127. A “pen register” is defined under the Pen
Register Act as “device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing,
addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility
from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted, provided,
however, that such information shall not include the contents of any
communication.” Id. § 3127(3).
87. S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 13, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3567.
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subject to interception under circumstances justifying such
expectation, but such term does not include any electronic
communication.”88 The most important aspect of this definition
is the expectation of privacy of those carrying on the
conversation. As several circuit courts have noted: “The
legislative history of Title III shows that Congress intended
th[e] definition [of ‘oral communication’] to parallel the
‘reasonable expectation of privacy test’ articulated by the
Supreme Court in Katz.”89
Although wire communications and oral communications
are conceptually distinct, it is possible for a communication to
appropriately be characterized as both in certain situations.90
As explained in one House Report:
The definitions of wire communication and oral
communication are not mutually exclusive.
Accordingly, different aspects of the same
communication
might
be
differently
characterized. For example, a person who
overhears one end of a telephone conversation by
listening in on the oral utterances of one of the
parties is intercepting an oral communication. If
the eavesdropper instead taps into the telephone
wire, he is intercepting a wire communication.91
Beyond regulating wire and oral communications,
Congress responded to evolving technology by amending Title

88. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2).
89. United States v. Turner, 209 F.3d 1198, 1200 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing
S. Rep. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2178;
United States v. Longoria, 177 F.3d 1179, 1181 (10th Cir. 1999)); see also
Larios, 593 F.3d at 92 (citing United States v. Dunbar, 553 F.3d 48, 57 (1st
Cir. 2009)). Moreover, at least one circuit court has held that the definition of
“oral communication” should “evolve” along with Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. See Larios, 593 F.3d at 92-93.
90. See United States v. Borch, 695 F. Supp. 898, 899, 901-02 (E.D.
Mich. 1988) (oral communications intercepted via inadvertently open phone
line are not wire communications), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United
States v. Baranek, 903 F.2d 1068 (6th Cir. 1990).
91. H. Rep. No. 99-647, at 34 (1986).
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III to provide protection for all “electronic communications.”92
With this addition, “authority to intercept electronic
communications became subject to the same requirements as
those applicable to the interception of oral and wire
communications.”93 The term “electronic communication”
includes “any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images,
sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole
or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or
photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign
commerce” with four limited exceptions.94 Some examples of
electronic communications include “digital-display paging
devices, fax machines, [and] text messaging.”95 Perhaps most
importantly, the definition of “electronic communications”
encompasses nearly all communications sent from a computer,
including email. Courts have held, for example, that websites96
and the submission of online forms97 fall within the definition
of “electronic communication.” Not all communications
originating on a computer, however, fall within this definition.
At least one district court, in a fact-intensive analysis,
determined that capturing keystrokes on a computer during
the transfer of this information from the keyboard to the local

92. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), Pub. L.
No. 99-508, tit. I, §§ 101-102, 100 Stat. 1848, 1848-53 (1986).
93. Brown v. Waddell, 50 F.3d 285, 289 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 2516).
94. Brown, 50 F.3d at 289 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)). These exceptions
include:
(A) any wire or oral communication; (B) any communication
made through a tone-only paging device; (C) any
communication from a tracking device (as defined in [18
U.S.C. § 3117]); or (D) electronic funds transfer information
stored by a financial institution in a communications system
used for the electronic storage and transfer of funds.
18 U.S.C. §2510(12).
95. See 2011 WIRETAP REPORT, supra note 5, at 9.
96. See, e.g., Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 876 (9th
Cir. 2002).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1047 (11th Cir.
2003); see also In re Pharmatrak Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing
Steiger, 318 F.3d at 1047; Konop, 302 F.3d at 876).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/7

16

1162

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:3

computer’s hard drive was not an “electronic communication.”98
The court’s reasoning in this case relied heavily on the fact that
the keystrokes were recorded as they went from the keyboard
to another internal part of the computer—i.e., the
communication at issue was wholly internal to the computer
system itself.99 This analysis seemingly suggests that the
transmission of keystrokes over the internet—e.g., from a
computer modem to a program such as Google—likely would
fall within the definition of an “electronic communication.”
Thus, it appears that while not all internal computer
communications are covered by Title III, all internet
communications of any stripe likely fall within its reach.
2. Prohibited Conduct
Once it is established that a communication is covered by
Title III, the “interception” of this communication is generally
prohibited.100 Under the statute, to “intercept” “means the
aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire,
electronic, or oral communication through the use of any
electronic, mechanical, or other device.”101 This definition has
two main elements: first, the contents of covered
communication must be “acqui[red]” and second, this
“acquisition” must occur by way of an “electronic, mechanical,
or other device.”102
Initially, courts throughout the country, largely relying on
an influential case from the Fifth Circuit, interpreted the
acquisition requirement narrowly to include only the
“contemporaneous acquisition of the communication.”103
98. See United States v. Ropp, 347 F. Supp. 2d 831, 832 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
99. See id. at 837-38.
100. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (2012).
101. Id. § 2510(4).
102. See id.
103. United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 658 (5th Cir. 1976),
superseded by statute Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986), as recognized in United States v. Smith,
155 F.3d 1051, 1057 n.11 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing cases). The Turk court
reasoned:
The words acquisition . . . through the use of any . . . device
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Congress, however, later amended the definition of “intercept”
to include “aural or other acquisition,” as opposed to merely
“aural acquisitions.”104 Similarly, Congress amended the
definition of wire communications to include “any electronic
storage of such communication.”105 Thus, the contemporaneity
requirement is no longer required to “intercept” a wire
communication as defined under Title III.106 Despite this,
courts have continued to apply a contemporaneity requirement
where electronic communications are at issue.107 The definition
of electronic communication makes no reference to stored
information.108 Courts have relied on this textual difference to
conclude that it was “Congress’ understanding that, although
one could intercept a wire communication in storage, one could
not intercept an electronic communication in storage.”109 Stored
electronic communications—e.g., emails stored on a computer
server—are governed by a different statutory scheme called the
Stored Communications Act, which was passed as Title II of
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986.110
suggest that the central concern is with the activity engaged
in at the time of the oral communication which causes such
communication to be overheard by the uninvited listeners. If
a person secrets a recorder in a room and thereby records a
conversation between two others, an acquisition occurs at
the time the recording is made. . . . [If] a new and different
aural acquisition occurs each time a recording of an oral
communication is replayed[, it] [] would mean that
innumerable interceptions, and thus violations of [Title III],
could follow from a single recording.
Turk, 526 F.2d at 658. (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted).
104. See § 101(a)(1)(3)(A), 100 Stat. at 1848 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 2510(4)).
105. See § 101(a)(1)(D), 100 Stat. at 1848 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 2510(1)).
106. See, e.g., Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service,
36 F.3d 457, 460-62 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.,
302 F.3d 868, 877 (9th Cir. 2002) (collecting cases).
107. See, e.g., Steve Jackson Games, Inc., 36 F.3d at 460 (citing Turk,
526 F.2d at 658).
108. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12).
109. Konop, 302 F.3d at 877 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(collecting cases).
110. See Stored Communications Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, tit. II,
§ 201, 100 Stat. 1848, 1860-68 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§
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In addition to the “acquisition” requirement, a
communication is only “intercepted” within the meaning of
Title III if the acquisition is done through an “electronic,
mechanical, or other device.”111 This phrase is defined in a
circular fashion as “any device or apparatus which can be used
to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication.”112 There
are two exceptions to this definition, neither of which is
particularly relevant to the use of wiretaps by law
enforcement.113
B. Procedure for Obtaining a Wiretap Warrant by Law
Enforcement
In addition to broadly prohibiting the use of wiretaps by
those unassociated with law enforcement, Title III also sets out
a detailed scheme that allows government officials to obtain a
warrant permitting the use of covert electronic surveillance.114
In promulgating this statutory scheme, Congress sought to
balance two competing concerns. First, Congress recognized
that “[t]he interception of [wire, oral, and electronic]
communications to obtain evidence of the commission of crimes
or to prevent their commission is an indispensable aid to law
enforcement and the administration of justice.”115 At the same
time, however, Congress sought to protect the privacy of
innocent individuals. Congress therefore determined that

2701-2711).
111. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5).
112. Id.
113. First, the “business extension use” exception permits the
interception of wire communications where: (1) the equipment used
“constitute[s] a ‘telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or
a[] component thereof,’ either provided by, and installed by, [the service
provider] in the ordinary course of its business or, equivalently, supplied by
[the subscriber] for connection to [the service provider’s] facilities,” and (2)
the use of that equipment “fall[s] within the ordinary course of [] business.”
Sanders v. Robert Bosch Corp., 38 F.3d 736, 740 (4th Cir. 1994); see also 18
U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a). Second, “a hearing aid or similar device being used to
correct subnormal hearing to not better than normal” may be used without
violating Title III. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(b).
114. See id. § 2518.
115. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets (Wiretap) Act of 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, § 801(c), 82 Stat. 197, 211 (1968).
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clandestine wiretap surveillance should occur “only when
authorized by a court of competent jurisdiction” and that
interception “should further be limited to certain major types of
offenses and specific categories of crime.”116
Before addressing the statutory scheme applicable to
securing a wiretap warrant, it is important to note that a
warrant is necessary only where all parties to the intercepted
communication are unaware of the surveillance.117 Section
2511(2)(c) of Title III provides that “[i]t shall not be unlawful . .
. for a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral,
or electronic communication, where such person is a party to
the communication or one of the parties to the communication
has given prior consent to such interception.”118 Thus, in many
cases, the government must resort to the warrant-application
procedures of Title III only where they have no cooperating
witness to rely upon. Accordingly, prosecutors principally rely
on the use of wiretaps only in complex criminal schemes, where
discretion is paramount to the investigation. This can perhaps
account for the relatively small (but increasing) number of
authorized federal wiretaps throughout the country.119
Generally speaking, once the Attorney General or another
designated DOJ official has pre-approved the use of a
wiretap,120 there are four main requirements that a
government applicant must comply with in order to obtain a
valid warrant under Title III. First, a specific predicate offense
must be identified as the basis for the investigation.121 Second,
the government must provide a full and complete statement of
the facts and circumstances sufficient to establish probable
cause and to satisfy a heightened particularity requirement.122
Third, the use of a wiretap must be “necessary” to further the

116. See id. § 801(d), 82 Stat. at 211-12.
117. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c).
118. Id.
119. In 2011, for example, the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts reported that only 792 court-authorized intercepts were granted at
the federal level. See 2011 WIRETAP REPORT, supra note 5, at 7.
120. See generally United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 508 (1974)
(discussing requirement); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1).
121. See discussion infra Parts III.B.1.
122. See discussion infra Parts III.B.2.
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government’s investigation.123 Finally, the government must
reasonably
minimize
its
interceptions
to
relevant
communications.124
1. Predicate Acts
Title III permits the use of wiretaps in the investigation of
dozens of specifically enumerated federal criminal offenses.125
The list of predicate offenses, however, is limited. For example,
a number of fraud-based crimes are listed as predicate offenses,
including mail fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, bank
fraud, and computer fraud.126 But other frauds, such as a
securities fraud prosecution for insider trading, are not listed
as predicate offenses.127 In addition to listing certain federal
offenses, Title III also permits limited state offenses to be
investigated using a wiretap so long as a separate state statute
authorizes its use.128 These state offenses include “murder,
kidnapping, gambling, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in
narcotic drugs, marihuana or other dangerous drugs, or other
crime dangerous to life, limb, or property, and punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year.”129
Although the investigation of a predicate crime is a
necessary requirement for securing an electronic surveillance
order, courts have permitted the use of wiretaps in the
prosecution of crimes not specifically listed in Title III. As the
United State Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
stated, “even if wiretaps could not be authorized for the
purpose of investigating [certain] crimes, nothing in Title III

123. See discussion infra Parts III.B.3.
124. See discussion infra Parts III.B.4.
125. For a list of predicate crimes, see 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1). An
investigation into a conspiracy to commit any predicate offense may also
serve as a valid basis for an electronic surveillance order under Title III. See
id. § 2516(1)(t).
126. See id. § 2516(1)(c).
127. See generally United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH),
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *9-23 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010) (discussing
relationship between wire fraud and securities fraud under Title III), aff’d,
719 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2013).
128. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2).
129. Id.
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bars the use of the fruits of authorized wiretaps obtained in the
pursuit of investigations of suspected crimes that are listed in
Title III” during the prosecution of non-Title III crimes.130 This
is specifically provided for in the statutory text:
When an investigative or law enforcement
officer, while engaged in intercepting wire, oral,
or electronic communications in the manner
authorized herein, intercepts wire, oral, or
electronic communications relating to offenses
other than those specified in the order of
authorization or approval, the contents thereof,
and evidence derived therefrom, may be disclosed
or used as [otherwise] provided.131
This provision has been described as, “in essence[,] a plain-view
exception [to the predicate offense requirement] allowing the
government to present evidence of other crimes discovered
while investigating an authorized offense.”132
In order for the government to use this “otherwise
intercepted” evidence at trial, however, the prosecutor must
apply to a judge “as soon as practicable.”133 Title III does not
itself define the applicable procedure for seeking subsequent
approval. The congressional history of this provision, however,
indicates that Congress thought that a subsequent application
should show (i) “that the original order was lawfully obtained;”
(ii) that the original application “was sought in good faith and
not as [a] subterfuge search;” and, (iii) that the “otherwise
intercepted . . . communication was in fact incidentally
130. SEC v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159, 173 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing 18
U.S.C. § 2517(5)).
131. 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5).
132. Howard J. Kaplan et al., The History and Law of Wiretapping, ABA
SECTION OF LITIG. 2012 SECTION ANNUAL CONFERENCE: THE LESSONS OF THE
RAJ RAJARATNAM TRIAL: BE CAREFUL WHO’S LISTENING 6 (April 20, 2012),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/mater
ials/sac_2012/29-1_history_and_law_of_wiretapping.authcheckdam.pdf;
see
also Rajaratnam, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *9-10 (calling this
statutory provision a “plain-view exception” (citing United States v.
Masciarelli, 558 F.2d 1064, 1067 (2d Cir. 1977); 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5))).
133. 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5).
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intercepted during the course of a lawfully executed order.”134
2. Probable Cause and Particularity
In addition to investigating a predicate offense, an
investigating officer must support his or her application for an
electronic surveillance order with enough information so that a
neutral and detached judge might conclude that there is
probable cause to issue the warrant. The statute specifically
provides that an applicant for a wiretap warrant must include:
[A] full and complete statement of the facts and
circumstances relied upon by the applicant, to
justify his belief that an order should be issued,
including (i) details as to the particular offense
that has been, is being, or is about to be
committed, (ii) except [in the case of a “roving”
wiretap], a particular description of the nature
and location of the facilities from which or the
place where the communication is to be
intercepted, (iii) a particular description of the
type of communications sought to be intercepted,
(iv) the identity of the person, if known,
committing
the
offense
and
whose
communications are to be intercepted.135
The standard for establishing probable cause under Title
III is co-equal with the standard generally applied for any
regular search warrant;136 the “totality-of-the-circumstances”
must reflect a “fair probability that . . . evidence of a crime will

134. S. Rep. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112,
2189 (citations omitted).
135. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b).
136. Id. § 2518(3); see also United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 110 (2d
Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Fury, 554 F.2d 522, 530 (2d Cir. 1977));
United States v. Leisure, 844 F.2d 1347, 1354 (8th Cir. 1988) (“[S]tatutory
probable cause standards set out in Title III are co-extensive with the
constitutional requirements embodied in the fourth amendment [sic].”)
(citations omitted).
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be found.”137 A judge may issue a wiretap warrant only if he or
she finds, in addition to “necessity,” probable cause to believe:
(i) “that an individual is committing, has committed, or is about
to commit a [predicate] offense;” (ii) “that particular
communications concerning that [predicate] offense” are likely
to be acquired through the permitted interception; and, (iii)
that the location in which the interception is to occur is being
used, or is about to be used, in connection with the predicate
offense.138
Unlike probable cause, the particularity requirements
under Title III are more stringent than the requirements under
the Fourth Amendment.139 “In the wiretap context, [the Fourth
Amendment particularity] requirements are satisfied by
identification of the telephone line to be tapped and the
particular conversations to be seized.”140 Additional
information, such as the name of the persons likely to be
overheard, is not constitutionally required.141 Title III,
however, requires that the following information be identified
with particularity:
(a) the identity of the person, if known, whose
communications are to be intercepted;
(b)
the
nature
and
location
of
the
communications facilities as to which, or the
place where, authority to intercept is granted;
(c) a particular description of the type of
communication sought to be intercepted, and a
statement of the particular offense to which it
relates;
(d) the identity of the agency authorized to
intercept the communications, and of the person
authorizing the application; and
(e) the period of time during which such
137. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
138. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3); see also United States v. Yannotti, 541 F.3d
112, 124 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Diaz, 176 F.3d at 110).
139. See, e.g., United States v. Gaines, 639 F.3d 423, 430-31 (8th Cir.
2011).
140. United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 427 n.15 (1977).
141. See id.
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interception is authorized, including a statement
as to whether or not the interception shall
automatically terminate when the described
communication has been first obtained.142
This list of particulars is significantly more detailed than
that which is required under the Fourth Amendment. In
certain situations, Title III provides for relaxed particularity
requirements in the case of wire and electronic intercepts upon
a showing of probable cause to believe that a party is avoiding
intercepts at a particular site,143 or, in the case of oral
intercepts, that providing the required specificity “is not
practical.”144 In these situations, a “roving” wiretap warrant is
issued, which allows investigators to target specific persons at
various locations.145 “Roving” wiretaps are relatively rare,
however, with only three federal and eight state-authorized
“roving” wiretap warrants issued in 2011.146 These heightened
particularity requirements have led as least one commentator
to note that “direct constitutional challenges to wiretaps have
rarely been litigated since the passage of Title III . . . because
Title III itself provides broader grounds for the suppression of
improperly obtained wiretap evidence than the exclusionary
rule.”147

142. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4).
143. See id. § 2518(11)(b).
144. See id. § 2518(11)(a).
145. See 2011 WIRETAP REPORT, supra note 5, at 8.
146. See id.
147. Kaplan et al., supra note 132 at 4; see also United States v. Jones,
132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (“After Katz, Congress did
not leave it to the courts to develop a body of Fourth Amendment case law
governing that complex subject. Instead, Congress promptly enacted a
comprehensive statute, and since that time, the regulation of wiretapping has
been governed primarily by statute and not by case law.”) (internal citation
omitted). Although “necessity” is not a constitutionally required prerequisite
to a valid wiretap, its basis is found in the Court’s opinion in Berger. There,
the Court stated:
Finally, the statute’s procedure, necessarily because its
success depends on secrecy, has no requirement for notice as
do conventional warrants, nor does it overcome this defect
by requiring some showing of special facts. On the contrary,
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3. “Necessity” Requirement
Congress also included within Title III a requirement that
law enforcement may resort to the use of wiretaps only when
doing so is “necessary” to further the investigation.148 The
necessity requirement was added to Title III by Congress “to
assure that wiretapping is not resorted to in situations where
traditional investigative techniques would suffice to expose the
crime.”149 In other words, mandating that a “full and complete
statement” regarding necessity be provided in the warrant
application is designed “both to underscore the desirability of
using less intrusive procedures and to provide courts with some
indication of whether any efforts were made to avoid needless
invasion of privacy.”150 Necessity in the absolute sense,
however, is not required. Rather, Congress assumed that
courts would apply this requirement “in a practical and
commonsense fashion.”151 Therefore, although wiretaps should
not be routinely used at the outset of an investigation, they
also need not be used as only a last resort.152
Before obtaining a warrant, a prosecutor must provide “a
full and complete statement as to whether or not other
investigative procedures have been tried and failed, or why
they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to
it permits uncontested entry without any showing of exigent
circumstances. Such a showing of exigency, in order to avoid
notice would appear more important in eavesdropping, with
its inherent dangers, than that required when conventional
procedures of search and seizure are utilized.
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967) (emphasis added).
148. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c).
149. United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 153 n.12 (1974) (citing S. Rep.
No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112).
150. United States v. Lilla, 699 F.2d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 1983).
151. S. Rep. No. 90-1097, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2190.
152. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 588 F.2d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir.
1978) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Poulsen, 655 F.3d 492, 504
(6th Cir. 2011) (“The requirement is intended to ensure that ‘the
investigators give serious consideration to the non-wiretap techniques prior
to applying for wiretap authority.’” (quoting United States v. Alfano, 838 F.2d
158, 163 (6th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted))).
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be too dangerous.”153 A barebones or boilerplate affidavit is not
sufficient.154 Similarly, “allegations that the crime being
investigated is inherently difficult to solve will not, by
themselves, suffice.”155 After proffering “a reasoned
explanation, grounded in the facts of the case, and which
squares with common sense,”156 an electronic surveillance order
may be issued where the “judge determines on the basis of the
facts submitted by the applicant that”157 clandestine electronic
surveillance is needed for the investigation to progress.158 A
judge’s decision as to the necessity of issuing a wiretap warrant
is afforded considerable discretion; a wiretap warrant will not
be later invalidated, for example, simply because a defense
lawyer can point to some investigative technique that could
have been but was not used.159
4. “Minimization” Requirement
As another additional layer of protection for personal
privacy, Title III contains several provisions meant to minimize
the intrusion of government agents in private conversations.
First, there are temporal limits on a wiretap warrant; no
communication may be intercepted “in any event longer than
thirty days.”160 If necessary, an extension may be sought, but
the applicant must provide “a statement setting forth the
results thus far obtained from the interception, or a reasonable
153. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c).
154. See Martinez, 588 F.2d at 1231-32.
155. Id. at 1231 (citations omitted); see also Lilla, 699 F.2d at 104
(collecting cases).
156. United States v. Scala, 388 F. Supp. 2d 396, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
157. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3).
158. See id. § 2518(3)(c).
159. See, e.g., United States v. Webster, 734 F.2d 1048, 1055 (5th Cir.
1984) (quoting United States v. Hyde, 574 F.2d 856, 867 (5th Cir. 1978)); see
also United States v. Concepcion, 579 F.3d 214, 217 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[W]e
grant considerable deference to the district court’s decision whether to allow
a wiretap.”).
160. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5). Courts have generally authorized intercepts for
the longest time permitted by Title III. In both 2010 and 2011, the average
length of an original authorization was twenty-nine days. See 2011 WIRETAP
REPORT, supra note 5, at 7.
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explanation of the failure to obtain such results.”161 This way,
an issuing judge is able to maintain supervision over the
surveillance.162 Additional temporal protections provide that
any interception must be done “as soon as practicable” and
“must terminate upon attainment of the authorized
objective.”163
In a broad sense, Title III provides that electronic
surveillance must be carried out in a fashion that “minimize[s]
the interception of communications not otherwise subject to
interception.”164 This requirement “does not forbid the
interception of all nonrelevant conversations, but rather
instructs the agents to conduct the surveillance in such a
manner as to ‘minimize’ the interception of such
conversations.”165 Courts have long recognized that avoiding
the interception of all innocent conversations is nearly
impossible.166 For example, in 2011, an average wiretap
surveillance scheme intercepted 3,716 communications, but
only 868 of those communications were incriminating.167
Partially because of this, investigators must do only what is
reasonable, and there is no bright-line rule as to what is
reasonable in this context.168 Instead, reasonableness is to be
determined on a case-by-case basis.169 For example, the more
wide-spread a conspiracy is the more covert surveillance is
justified.170 Reasonableness must be looked at in the context of
the entire wiretap surveillance scheme; it cannot be
determined on a “chat-by-chat” basis.171 Moreover, the focus of
161. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(f); see also id. § 2518(5). The longest intercept
permitted in 2011 lasted for 246 days and was used in a narcotics
investigation. See 2011 WIRETAP REPORT, supra note 5, at 7.
162. A judge may also require that progress reports be submitted. See id.
§ 2518(6).
163. Id. § 2518(5).
164. Id.
165. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 140 (1978).
166. See, e.g., United States v. Bynum, 485 F.2d 490, 500 (2d Cir. 1973),
cert. granted, judgment vacated, 417 U.S. 903 (1974).
167. See 2011 WIRETAP REPORT, supra note 5, at 21 tbl.4.
168. See Scott, 436 U.S. at 139-40.
169. Id. at 140.
170. Id.
171. See United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH), 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *99 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010) (quoting United States
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this inquiry should be on the actions of the government agent
conducting the surveillance, not on his or her motives.172 The
government has the initial burden to establish prima facie that
its interceptions were reasonably minimized.173 After the
government meets its burden, a defendant must prove that,
“despite a good faith compliance with the minimization
requirements, a substantial number of non-pertinent
conversations have been intercepted unreasonably.”174
C. Prohibition on Use of Wiretap Evidence Obtained in
Violation of Title III
The penalties for improperly intercepting communications
in violation of Title III are relatively severe. An individual
subjects him or herself to up to five years in prison, as well as a
fine, for unlawfully intercepting a protected communication.175
In addition, no recordings obtained in violation of the statute
may be admitted as evidence in a court proceeding. 18 U.S.C. §
2515 provides:
Whenever any wire or oral communication has
been intercepted, no part of the contents of such
communication and no evidence derived
therefrom may be received in evidence in any
trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before
v. McGuinness, 764 F. Supp. 888, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)), aff’d, 719 F.3d 139
(2d Cir. 2013). But cf. United States v. Goffer, 756 F. Supp. 2d 588, 595-96
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that the Second Circuit has not definitively ruled on
this issue, but stating that “district courts in [the Second] Circuit have
favored the approach of suppressing only the improperly minimized calls”
(citing United States v. Principie, 531 F.2d 1132, 1140-41 (2d Cir. 1976);
United States v. Pierce, 493 F. Supp. 2d 611, 636 (W.D.N.Y. 2006); United
States v. King, 991 F. Supp. 77, 92 n.16 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); United States v.
Orena, 883 F. Supp. 849, 855 (E.D.N.Y. 1995))).
172. Scott, 436 U.S. at 139.
173. Rajaratnam, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *100 (citing United
States v. Rizzo, 491 F.2d 215, 217 n.7 (2d Cir. 1974)).
174. Id. (quoting United States v. Menendez, No. S(3) 04 Cr. 219 (DAB),
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11367, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2005); United States v.
Ianniello, 621 F. Supp. 1455, 1470 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
175. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4)(a) (2012).

29

2013]

EXPANDED USE OF WIRETAP EVIDENCE

1175

any court, grand jury, department, officer,
agency, regulatory body, legislative committee,
or other authority of the United States, a State,
or a political subdivision thereof if the disclosure
of that information would be in violation of this
chapter.176
A wiretap performed in accordance with a judiciallysanctioned wiretap warrant is not in violation of the statute so
long as the application requirements of Title III are complied
with.177 Suppression is appropriate, however, in three
situations: “(i) [if] the communication was unlawfully
intercepted; (ii) the order of authorization or approval under
which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or (iii) the
interception was not made in conformity with the order of
authorization or approval.”178 The Supreme Court has
interpreted the contours on Title III’s suppression provision in
only three cases, all of which were decided in the 1970s.179
These cases are discussed more fully below.180 In the context of
governmental investigations, courts have been increasingly
forgiving of defects in the application process for electronic
surveillance warrants. As some of the recently decided insidertrading cases illustrate, this is a troubling trend likely to spur
the increased use of wiretaps as a matter of course.181
IV. Recent Developments and the Weakening of Title III’s
Restrictive Provisions
When Title III was originally promulgated, Congress
appeared to go to great lengths to balance properly privacy and
law-enforcement interests. As discussed above, several layers
of protection were added to prevent government-secured
electronic surveillance orders from becoming commonplace and
176. 18 U.S.C. § 2515.
177. See generally id. §§ 2511-2522.
178. See id. § 2518(10)(a).
179. See United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413 (1977); United States v.
Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974); United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974).
180. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
181. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
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from being overly intrusive.182 Recent developments, however,
appear to indicate that the balance is decisively tilting away
from privacy protection in favor of a more broad-based use of
wiretap surveillance by law enforcement. A review of recent
insider-trading cases indicates some troubling trends: first, the
apparent scope of the types of cases that could be investigated
using covert electronic surveillance has become unbounded;183
second, courts have steadily weakened the standard for
suppression under Title III—in part by conflating Title III and
Fourth Amendment analyses—in apparent contradiction to
several Supreme Court cases dating to the 1970s.184
A. Plain View, Predicate Offenses, and the Expanding
Landscape of Wiretap Surveillance
In several recent securities fraud prosecutions, the
defendants have sought to suppress wiretap evidence by
arguing that securities fraud is not a predicate offense under
Title III.185 To date, none of these challenges have been
successful.186 This recent case law presents a troubling trend
resulting in what effectively amounts to a presumption of good
faith on behalf of prosecuting authorities in the investigation of
almost any crime. This presumption is nearly impossible to
overcome so long as (1) probable cause exists to investigate
wire fraud, mail fraud, money laundering, or racketeering
activity, and (2) the desire to investigate a related non-Title III
offense is openly acknowledged in the wiretap warrant
182. See supra Part III.
183. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
184. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
185. See, e.g., United States v. Gupta, No. 11 Cr. 907 (JSR), 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 45610, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2012) (discussing that Gupta
argued that insider trading is not governed by Title III); United States v.
Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010) (noting that motions by Raj Rajaratnam and
Danielle Chiesi make roughly the same arguments, including that securities
fraud is not a predicate offense under Title III), aff’d, 719 F.3d 139 (2d Cir.
2013).
186. See Gupta, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45610, at *2 (stating that Judge
Holwell’s opinion in Rajaratnam explained how insider trading is “an offense
as to which wiretapping is authorized under Title III” (citing Rajaratnam,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *19)).
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affidavit.187
Perhaps the case most indicative of this recent trend is a
decision made by Judge Richard Holwell in the prosecution of
defendants Raj Rajaratnam and Danielle Chiesi.188 In this case,
both defendants sought to suppress the wiretap evidence
obtained by federal prosecutors by arguing, inter alia, that
securities fraud—the crime for which both defendants were
indicted—was not a predicate offense.189 In rejecting this
argument, Judge Holwell found that probable cause existed to
believe that the defendants were committing wire fraud and
that the government acted in good faith in investigating this
predicate offense.190 As a result, the incidental interceptions of
evidence indicative of a securities-fraud scheme were subject to
the plain-view exception contained in § 2517(5), and therefore
this evidence was not suppressed.191 Although this conclusion is
in some sense unsurprising given the statutory mandate of §
2517(5), the collateral consequences of the reasoning
underpinning this conclusion may have long-ranging effect.
The defendants in the Rajaratnam case made three
primary arguments seeking to suppress the wiretap intercepts
on the basis that it was not a predicate offense: first,
defendants argued that it was the securities fraud
investigation, not the wire fraud investigation, that was the

187. See, e.g., Gupta, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45610, at *2-3. The court
stated:
So long as the Government acts in good faith with respect to
informing the Court of the crimes it is investigating and
learning of in connection with the wiretap, as Judge Howell
[sic] and this Court conclude was done here, the
Government is free to use evidence obtained from an
authorized wiretap in the prosecution of a crime not listed
in § 2516.
Id.
188. See Rajaratnam, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *1-8.
Rajaratnam and Chiesi’s convictions were later upheld on appeal, although
the Second Circuit did not address this argument in its opinion. See United
States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2013).
189. See Rajaratnam, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *1-2.
190. Id. at *9-23.
191. Id.
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government’s primary purpose; second, even if securities fraud
investigation was not the primary purpose, it was at least an
anticipated consequence of electronic surveillance; and third,
authorizing the interception of communications evidencing
securities fraud would undermine congressional intent.192
The court rejected the defendants’ first argument, stating
that it “unrealistically assume[d] a gulf between” wire fraud
and securities fraud.193 Although the court recognized that
securities fraud and wire fraud have different elements that
the government must prove to secure a conviction, the court
nevertheless noted that “unlikely is the insider trading scheme
that uses no interstate wires.”194 In fact, the court recognized
that “[s]ometimes the government even charges both kinds of
fraud for the same core conduct.”195 This presents a troubling
reality, however, in an ever more “connected” world. What the
court noted about the relationship between securities fraud and
wire fraud can also be said about the relationship between wire
fraud and a laundry list of other offenses not specifically
subject to electronic surveillance under Title III.
Although courts describe the federal mail and wire fraud
statutes in different ways, a federal prosecutor must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt five general elements in order to
secure a conviction. The government must prove “that the
defendant (1) used either mail or wire communications in the
foreseeable furtherance, (2) of a scheme to defraud, (3)
involving a material deception, (4) with the intent to deprive
another of, (5) either property or honest services.”196 Nearly
192. Id. at *14.
193. Id.
194. Id. at *15.
195. Id. (citing H. Rep. 100-910 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6043, 6074; United States v. Carpenter, 484 U.S. 19, 28 (1987)).
196. Charles Doyle, Mail and Wire Fraud: A Brief Overview of Federal
Criminal
Law,
CONG.
RESEARCH
SERV.
(July
21,
2011),
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41930.pdf [hereinafter Doyle, Mail and Wire
Fraud]; see also United States v. Briscoe, 65 F.3d 576, 583 (7th Cir. 1995)
(citing United States v. Ames Sintering Co., 927 F.2d 232, 234 (6th Cir. 1990)
(per curiam)); United States v. Frey, 42 F.3d 795, 797 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting
that “the wire fraud statute is identical to mail fraud statute except that it
speaks of communications transmitted by wire.”). The crime of wire fraud
consists of several elements, notably (1) a scheme to defraud and, (2) the use
of interstate wire communication to further the scheme. See, e.g., United
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every white-collar criminal offense has the capacity to meet
this definition so long as the jurisdictional element—i.e., the
use of a wire or mail communication—is satisfied.
Federal offenses that are distinct crimes but under certain
circumstances could nevertheless also be prosecuted as wire
fraud include: (1) the knowing submission of a false claim
against the United States;197 (2) conspiracies to defraud the
United States;198 (3) knowing and willfully making a material
false statement on a matter within the jurisdiction of the
federal government;199 (4) securities and commodities fraud;200
(5) fraud in foreign labor contracting;201 (6) theft or bribery
related to programs receiving federal funds;202 (7) violations of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act;203 and (8) Medicare204 and
Medicaid205 kickback schemes.206 None of these offenses,
however, are predicate offenses under Title III.207
The fact that the same primary conduct can serve as
evidence in a prosecution under multiple federal criminal
statutes is not unique to the wire fraud context. Judge Holwell,
for example, noted in the Rajaratnam case that prosecutors
had also named money laundering as a Title III predicate
offense.208 The main federal money laundering statute, 18
States v. Proffit, 49 F.3d 404, 406 n.1 (8th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted)
(noting four elements); United States v. Hanson, 41 F.3d 580, 583 (10th Cir.
1994) (citations omitted) (noting two elements); United States v. Faulkner, 17
F.3d 745, 771 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted) (noting two elements);
United States v. Cassiere, 4 F.3d 1006, 1011 (1st Cir. 1993) (citation omitted)
(noting three elements); United States v. Maxwell, 920 F.2d 1028, 1035 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (citations omitted) (noting two elements).
197. See 18 U.S.C. § 287 (2012).
198. See id. § 371.
199. See id. § 1001.
200. See id. § 1348.
201. See id. § 1351.
202. See id. § 666.
203. See id. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1-dd-3 (2012).
204. See id. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2012).
205. See id.
206. For a discussion of the crimes listed in notes 197-205, see generally
Doyle, Mail and Wire Fraud, supra note 196, at 14-23.
207. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516.
208. See United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH), 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *12-13 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010), aff’d, 719 F.3d 139
(2d Cir. 2013); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1)(c).
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U.S.C. § 1956,
outlaws financial transactions involving the
proceeds of other certain crimes—predicate
offenses referred to as ‘specified unlawful
activities’ (sometimes known as SUA)—
committed or attempted (1) with the intent to
promote further [SUA] offenses; (2) with the
intent to evade taxation; (3) knowing the
transaction is designed to conceal laundering of
the proceeds; or (4) knowing the transaction is
designed to avoid anti-laundering reporting
requirements.209
There are three general categories of SUA offenses: state,
foreign, and federal crimes.210 Similar to wire fraud, many of
these SUA offenses are not listed as offenses subject to
electronic surveillance under Title III. For example, the list of
SUA offenses include the following crimes not generally subject
to investigation using wiretap surveillance: fraud by or against
a foreign bank;211 theft or bribery related to programs receiving
federal funds;212 crimes related to fraudulent bank entries;213
fraud in federal credit union entries;214 crimes related to
Federal Deposit Insurance transactions;215 and numerous
environmental crimes.216 There has also been recent
consideration of naming tax evasion itself as a predicate
209. Charles Doyle, Money Laundering: An Overview of 18 U.S.C. 1956
and Related Federal Criminal Law, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 2 (July 21, 2011),
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33315.pdf [hereinafter Doyle, Money
Laundering].
210. See id. at 4-5.
211. See 12 U.S.C. § 3101(7) (2012); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(B)(iii).
212. See 18 U.S.C. § 666; see also id. § 1956(c)(7)(D).
213. See id. § 1005; see also id. § 1956(c)(7)(D).
214. See id. § 1006; see also id. § 1956(c)(7)(D).
215. See id. § 1007; see also id. § 1956(c)(7)(D).
216. These include crimes under the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (2012), the Ocean Dumping Act, 33 U.S.C. §§
1401-1445, 16 U.S.C. § 1447-1447f (2012), 33 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2805, the Act to
Prevent Pollution from Ships, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1905-1915, the Safe Drinking
Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-26 (2012), and the Resources Conservation
and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(k); see also 18 U.S.C. 1956(c)(7)(E).
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offense for money laundering; the Financial Action Task Force,
a global body set up to fight money laundering, recently added
“serious tax crimes” to its list of predicate money laundering
offenses.217
Most expansively, however, money laundering under §
1856 also includes in its list of SUA offenses, any crime that
can constitute a predicate offense under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act.218
Violations of RICO may also independently serve as a basis for
electronic surveillance under Title III.219 Regardless of whether
RICO or money laundering is used as the gateway to a wiretap
warrant, the list of RICO predicate offenses is staggering.
Justice Scalia has derisively noted that the prosecutable
offenses under RICO include “a laundry list of nearly every
federal crime under the sun.”220 Thus, these four crimes—i.e.,
wire fraud, mail fraud, money laundering, and racketeering—
all provide a backdoor into Title III for offenses that cannot
otherwise
be
investigated
using
covert
electronic
surveillance.221 Moreover, under most circumstances these

217. See David Jolly, International Crackdown on Tax Crimes
Intensifies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2012, at B4, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/17/business/global/global-financial-taskforce-to-take-on-tax-cheats.html?_r=0.
218. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(A). For the RICO statute, see 18 U.S.C. §§
1961-1968 (2012).
219. See id. § 2516(1)(c).
220. James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 223 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
221. The DOJ has specifically adopted this reading of the predicate
offense requirement. See Brief for the United States of America at 55-56,
United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2013) (No. 11-4416-cr),
2012 WL 1573547, at *55-56. They wrote:
Insider trading violates various criminal statutes explicitly
listed in Title III, including the wire fraud statute. In
addition to wire fraud, Title III authorizes the interception
of wire communications to seek evidence of money
laundering. Both wire fraud and securities fraud are
specified unlawful activities under the money laundering
statute. Accordingly, certain financial transactions
involving the proceeds of insider trading constitute money
laundering. Title III also allows courts to authorize the use
of wiretap recordings in the prosecution of crimes not listed
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crimes can be the basis for nearly any white-collar criminal
investigation and subsequent prosecution.
As noted above, although Congress provided for what
amounts to a plain-view exception to the predicate offense
requirement, it also provided protection against abuse of this
exception.222 Namely, a prosecutor must obtain court
permission “as soon as practicable” in order to use wiretap
evidence obtained incidentally when investigating a predicate
offense.223 In line with the legislative history of Title III, courts
have largely adopted a “good faith” standard for determining
whether to admit otherwise intercepted evidence.224
In the Rajaratnam case, Judge Holwell concluded that the
government had acted in good faith, and not as a subterfuge for
gathering evidence of securities fraud, because the government
“candidly detailed the nature of the scheme for which wiretaps
were sought.”225 “In other words,” Judge Holwell clarified, “the
government made quite clear that it wanted to use wiretaps to
investigate an insider trading conspiracy, and that the
evidence would likely uncover evidence of wire fraud[,] money
laundering . . . and securities fraud . . . .”226 This reasoning
results in the perverse notion that the more blatant the
government is in disclosing that its primary intent is to seek
evidence of a non-predicate offense, the more likely the
government will be in successfully using this evidence.227 The
court implicitly concluded that, so long as probable cause exists
to investigate a predicate offense, it did not matter whether
investigating a non-predicate offense was the government’s
primary goal.228 The Second Circuit recently embraced this

in the statute.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
222. See supra Part III.B.1.
223. 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5).
224. See United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH), 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *11-15 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010) (compiling cases),
aff’d, 719 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2013).
225. Id. at *12.
226. Id. (citation omitted).
227. See id. at 12-13.
228. Id.

37

2013]

EXPANDED USE OF WIRETAP EVIDENCE

1183

reality with open arms. The court in United States v. Goffer,229
concluded that a representation that the government expected
to uncover evidence of securities fraud in a wiretap application
“ensured that the wiretaps were not obtained as a ‘subterfuge’
or to surreptitiously investigate crimes other than those about
which they informed the court.”230 This statement seems to
reveal that the Second Circuit understood the government to be
investigating securities fraud when applying for the wiretap
warrant at issue.
Although the Second Circuit in Goffer did not explain the
logic behind this conclusion, Judge Holwell in Rajaratnam did.
In rejecting one argument made by the Defendants, Judge
Holwell explained in a footnote that:
The issuing judges did not know and could not
have predicted that the government would
ultimately charge the defendants with only
securities fraud, not wire fraud or money
laundering. But the government should not be
required to charge the crime for which it obtains
wiretap authorization. Although charging a
defendant with the crime for which wiretapping
was authorized is some evidence of the
government’s good faith, the converse is not
necessarily true. The government’s charging
decisions depend on a variety of factors. That it
decides not to charge a defendant with a crime
for which it previously sought wiretap
authorization does not imply it had no legitimate
reason for a wiretap to begin with.231
Judge Holwell then went on to reject the defendants’
second argument—i.e., that the securities fraud evidence was
not
obtained
“incidentally”—because the
government

229. No. 11-3591-cr(L), 2013 WL 3285115, at *1 (2d Cir. July 1, 2013).
230. Id. at *5.
231. Rajaratnam, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *13 n.5 (internal
citations omitted).
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anticipated its discovery.232 Despite recognizing that earlier
cases had used the word “inadvertent” in dicta, the court
dismissed this reading of the statute noting that the legislative
history instead used the word “incidental” and concluded that
“recent authority has implicitly rejected [the ‘inadvertent’]
gloss on the standard.”233 This interpretation adopts the same
standard applicable to the plain-view exception under the
Fourth Amendment. In Horton v. California,234 the Supreme
Court held that evidence found in plain view, the incriminating
nature of which is immediately apparent, need not be
suppressed where the investigating officers have a valid search
warrant for the premises, despite the fact that the discovery of
this evidence was not “inadvertent.”235 In other words, the
plain-view exception does not require that the discovery of the
evidence in plain view be an unexpected consequence of the
otherwise valid search.236
In practical effect, the standard of good faith adopted by
the Rajaratnam court results in a presumption of good faith on
behalf of the government that a defendant will rarely, if ever,
be able to overcome.237 A criminal defendant is not likely to
ever have access to subjective evidence of the intent of
investigating authorities. Therefore, in nearly all instances,
only objective evidence may be relied upon to attack the
government’s good faith.238 The defendants in Rajaratnam

232. See id. at *14-19.
233. Id. at *17 (citing United States v. Marion, 535 F.2d 697, 701 (2d
Cir. 1976); United States v. Masciarelli, 558 F.2d 1064, 1067 (2d Cir. 1977);
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served on John Doe, 889 F.2d 384, 388 (2d Cir.
1989); United States v. Wager, No. 00 Cr. 629 (TPG), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17739, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2002); United States v. McKinnon, 721 F.2d
19, 22-23 (1st Cir. 1983)).
234. 496 U.S. 128 (1990).
235. See id. at 133-37.
236. See id.
237. But cf. United States v. Gigante, 538 F.2d 502, 505 (2d Cir. 1976)
(rejecting argument that suppression for failing to abide by the sealing
provisions of Title III was draconian and unwarranted absent proof of actual
tampering, in part because of the fear that editing and modification of
wiretap evidence “can rarely, if ever, be detected”).
238. See, e.g., United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 154 (2d Cir.
2013) (“Subjective intent, after all, is often demonstrated with objective
evidence.”).
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presented the court with two pieces of objective evidence: first,
the government did not charge either defendant with a Title III
predicate offense; and second, the government knew that it was
likely to uncover incriminating evidence of securities fraud.239
Taken together, these two pieces of evidence present, at the
very least, a prima facie case that the government was
engaging in a subterfuge search and never intended its
investigation of wire fraud to be its primary objective. Even
this evidence, however, was insufficient in the court’s eyes to
suppress the fruits of the wiretap warrant.240 This is troubling
because these two pieces of evidence will often be the only
objective indication of the government’s intent a defendant is
likely to have. Taking this conclusion—along with the backdoor
route into Title III provided by investigations into mail fraud,
wire fraud, money laundering, and racketeering—the flood
gates to investigating non-Title III offenses are wide open. As
long as the wiretap applicant readily acknowledges that an
otherwise impermissible wiretap investigation is related to a
permissible wiretap investigation, it will be nearly impossible
for a defendant to prove bad faith.
Other courts have adopted similar reasoning. During the
prosecution of Rajat Gupta, the former head of the consulting
company McKinsey & Co., and a co-conspirator of Raj
Rajaratnam and Danielle Chiesi, Gupta’s lawyers made
arguments nearly identical to that of Rajaratnam and Chiesi.241
The court, however, fully accepted the reasoning of Judge
Holwell.242 In the recent case of United States v. Levy,243
another judge in the Southern District of New York adopted
similar reasoning.244 Most recently, the Second Circuit has

239. See United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH), 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *12-13 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010), aff’d, 719 F.3d 139
(2d Cir. 2013).
240. Id. at *19.
241. United States v. Gupta, No. 11 Cr. 907 (JSR), 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 45610, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2012) (“Gupta offers no arguments
different from the arguments Judge Holwell considered in the Rajaratnam
case. He argues instead that Judge Holwell's conclusions are in error.”).
242. Id.
243. No. 1:(S5) 11 Cr. 62 (PAC), 2012 WL 5830631, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
16, 2012).
244. See id. at *3-10.
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expressly put its stamp of approval on this reasoning.245 This
emerging trend is likely to encourage government authorities
to continue to expand the use of wiretaps in white-collar
investigations not specifically listed under Title III.
B. United States v. Giordano and the Movement away from
Strict Compliance with the Necessity Requirement
Another troubling trend has emerged in the context of
Title III: courts are relaxing the statutory requirements of
substantive wiretap application provisions—most importantly,
the necessity requirement. As a result, courts rarely suppress
evidence on the basis of the government’s failure to strictly
abide by § 2518, which requires a “full and complete statement”
by the applicant as to why a wiretap is necessary.246 For
example, within the Second Circuit, there have only been two
cases in which wiretap evidence was suppressed based on the
government’s failure to prove necessity, and one of those cases
was later reversed on appeal.247 This development seemingly
contradicts a line of cases decided by the Supreme Court in the
1970s. Rather than applying the suppression standard
expressed in United States v. Giordano248 and its progeny,
courts have superimposed the Fourth Amendment standard
expressed in Franks v. Delaware249 onto the statute-based
necessity requirement. By ignoring the mandate of Giordano,
these same courts have permitted wiretap applicants a ‘second
bite at the apple’ that was not imagined within the framework
of the statutory scheme.

245. “When the government investigates insider trading for the bona
fide purpose of prosecuting wire fraud, it can thereby collect evidence of
securities fraud, despite the fact that securities fraud is not itself a Title III
predicate offense.” United States v. Goffer, No. 11-3591-cr(L), 2013 WL
3285115, at *5 (2d Cir. July 1, 2013) (quoting Rajaratnam, 2010 WL 4867402,
at *6).
246. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (2012).
247. See Rajaratnam, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *89 n.26 (citing
United States v. Lilla, 699 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v.
Concepcion, No. 07 CR 1095 (SAS), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51386, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2008), rev’d 579 F.3d 214 (2d Cir. 2009)).
248. 416 U.S. 505 (1974).
249. 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
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In Giordano, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he mature
judgment of a particular, responsible Department of Justice
official is interposed as a critical precondition to any judicial
order” permitting the use of a wiretap.250 Therefore, “primary
or derivative evidence secured by wire interceptions pursuant
to a court order issued in response to an application which was,
in fact, not authorized by one of the statutorily designated
officials must be suppressed.”251 In reaching this conclusion,
the Court stated that the issue of suppression under Title III
“does not turn on the judicially fashioned exclusionary rule
aimed at deterring violations of Fourth Amendment rights, but
upon the provisions of Title III.”252 The Court then noted that §
2515 mandates the exclusion of wiretap evidence form judicial
proceedings “if the disclosure of that information would be in
violation of this chapter,” and that § 2518(10)(a) in turn
supplies three statutory grounds for suppression.253 These
three grounds for suppression include: “(i) if the communication
was unlawfully intercepted; (ii) the order of authorization or
approval under which it was intercepted is insufficient on its
face; or (iii) the interception was not made in conformity with
the order of authorization or approval.”254
250. Giordano, 416 U.S. at 515-16. The Court reasoned that this
requirement was intended to hold certain public officials politically
accountable. See id. at 516-23. The specific statute in place at the time of the
Giordano decision was later amended to include, in addition to certain DOJ
officials requiring Senate confirmation, “[t]he Attorney General, Deputy
Attorney General, Associate Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney
General, any acting Assistant Attorney General, or any Deputy Assistant
Attorney General or acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the
Criminal Division or National Security Division specially designated by the
Attorney General.” See 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1). As the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals stated in United States v. Anderson, 39 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 1994),
abrogated by Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813 (1999), under the
current statute “[i]t would perhaps be more accurate, then, to attribute to
Congress the purpose of limiting such authority to identifiable officials in
positions of trust.” Anderson, 39 F.3d at 339 n.6.
251. Giordano, 416 U.S. at 508.
252. Id. at 524; see also Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 986
(6th Cir. 2001) (“Congress made [Title III] the primary vehicle by which to
address violations of privacy interests in the communications field. . . . All
such constitutional questions are pretermitted.”).
253. Giordano, 416 U.S. at 524 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2012))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
254. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/7

42

1188

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:3

In interpreting these three grounds for suppression, the
Court determined “that paragraphs (ii) and (iii) must be
deemed to provide suppression for failure to observe some
statutory requirements that would not render interceptions
unlawful under paragraph (i).”255 This, however, does not mean
“that no statutory infringements whatsoever are also unlawful
interceptions within the meaning of paragraph (i).”256
Therefore, although subsection (i) undoubtedly permits
suppression for violations of the Fourth Amendment, it also
permits suppression for certain statutory violations as well.257
The Court then set forth the governing standard for what
constitutes an “unlawful” interception under the first prong of §
2518(10)(a):
[W]e think Congress intended to require
suppression where there is failure to satisfy any
of those statutory requirements that directly and
substantially implement the congressional
intention to limit the use of intercept procedures
to those situations clearly calling for the
employment of this extraordinary investigative
device . . . [Where a requirement] was intended
to play a central role in the statutory scheme[,] . .
. suppression must follow when it is shown that
this statutory requirement has been ignored.258
In reconciling legislative history by indicating that §
2518(10)(a) was meant to “largely reflect[] existing law” but at
the same time “serve to guarantee that the standards of [Title
III] will sharply curtail the unlawful interception of wire and
oral communications,” the Court held that “it would not extend
existing search-and-seizure law for Congress to provide for the
suppression of evidence obtained in violation of explicit
statutory prohibitions.”259

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

Giordano, 416 U.S. at 527.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 527-28.
Id. at 528-29 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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The Supreme Court revisited the issue of suppression
under Title III in the same year that Giordano was decided. In
United States v. Chavez,260 the Court concluded that evidence
derived from a wiretap need not be suppressed where the
Attorney General authorizes the wiretap application but where
the application and order both incorrectly identify an Assistant
Attorney General as the authorizing official.261 “Under § 2515,
suppression is not mandated for every violation of Title III . . .
.”262 In Chavez, “the misidentification of the officer authorizing
the wiretap application did not affect the fulfillment of any of
the reviewing or approval functions required by Congress.”263
Rather, the requirement that the authorizing official be named
was meant to serve a reporting requirement and to hold this
official publicly responsible for the wiretap; it did not provide
an essential or functional role in protecting against
unwarranted wiretap use.264 In dicta, the Court concluded that
despite the outcome of this particular case, “strict adherence by
the Government to the provisions of Title III would nonetheless
be more in keeping with the responsibilities Congress has
imposed upon it when authority to engage in wiretapping or
electronic surveillance is sought.”265 The Court has since
“reemphasize[d]” this.266
Both Giordano and Chavez set forth the applicable
framework for suppression under Title III, and only one other
case has been considered by the Supreme Court under this
framework.267 In United States v. Donovan, the Court held that
260. 416 U.S. 562 (1974).
261. Id. at 565.
262. Id. at 575.
263. Id.
264. See id. at 577-79.
265. Id. at 580 (emphasis added).
266. See United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 439-40 (1977).
267. In 1974, the Court also decided United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143
(1974), which held that the government’s failure to name a party in the
application whose conversation was likely subject to interception did not
require suppression where the government did not have probable cause to
believe that the un-named person was committing the offense under
investigation. See id. at 155. In other words, “Title III requires the naming of
a person in the application or interception order only when the law
enforcement authorities have probable cause to believe that that individual is
‘committing the offense’ for which the wiretap is sought.” Id. This decision,

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/7

44

1190

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:3

the government’s failure to strictly adhere to the following nonsubstantive provisions of Title III does not make subsequent
intercepts “unlawful” and therefore does not require
suppression: (1) the identification of all those likely to be heard
during the intercept, as required under § 2518(1)(b)(iv)268; and
(2) the “duty to inform the judge of all identifiable persons
whose conversations were intercepted,” as required pursuant to
§ 2518(8)(d).269 In reaching this conclusion the Court continued
to place an emphasis on the statutory preconditions that help
both the Justice Department and the issuing judge in
determining whether a wiretap is appropriate in a given case.
In other words, emphasis is placed on those provisions that
were “intended to serve as an independent restraint on resort
to the wiretap procedure.”270 For example, the Court stated
that the intercept at issue in Chavez “was lawful because the
Justice Department had performed its task of prior approval,
and the instant intercept is lawful because the application
provided sufficient information to enable the issuing judge to
determine that the statutory preconditions were satisfied,”
regardless of whether or not certain people were identified in
the application.271 To a lesser degree, the Court has also placed
emphasis on the government’s intent in failing to abide by the
statutory provisions,272 although the Court has never expanded
however, focused more on the statutory text of §§ 2518(1)(b)(iv) and
2518(4)(a), not on Title III’s suppression provision. See generally id. at 15258. Similarly, the Court briefly discussed suppression in Scott v. United
States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978), but ultimately did not need to interpret §
2518(10)(a) because it concluded that there was no statutory violation of the
minimization requirement. See id. at 142-43.
268. See Donovan, 429 U.S. at 435-37.
269. Id. at 438.
270. Id. at 439; see also United States v. Gigante, 538 F.2d 502, 505 (2d
Cir. 1976) (finding that the requirement of judicial sealing immediately upon
the expiration of the authorizing order was designed to limit the use of
intercept procedures and was therefore central to the statutory scheme and
rejecting argument that suppression for failing to abide by this requirement
was unwarranted and draconian in light of the “carefully planned strictures
on the conduct of electronic surveillance”).
271. Donovan, 429 U.S. at 436.
272. See, e.g., id. at 436 n.23. Here, the court stated:
There is no suggestion in this case that the Government
agents knowingly failed to identify [defendants] for the
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upon this.273
The Supreme Court has not revisited the issue of
suppression under Title III since the 1970s. Despite the fact
that the Court’s suppression analysis focuses on whether each
statutory requirement is directly related to limiting the use of
wiretaps, lower federal courts have recently weakened this
standard. In the context of the “necessity” requirement, several
circuit courts have adopted a Franks274 analysis in determining
whether wiretap evidence should be suppressed.275 Similarly,
the district court in the Rajaratnam prosecution used this
analysis, and the Second Circuit later affirmed.276 In the
context of the necessity requirement, a Franks analysis
requires suppression where the defendant, after an evidentiary
hearing, can prove (1) that a misstatement or omission
regarding the issue of necessity in the government’s application
was the result of a “deliberate falsehood” or “reckless disregard
for the truth”; and (2) that the omitted or erroneous
information was material to the district court’s finding of
necessity.277
purpose of keeping relevant information from the District
Court that might have prompted the court to conclude that
probable cause was lacking. If such a showing had been
made, we would have a different case.
Id.
273. But cf. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 139 n.13 (1978)
(discussing the role of motive under a Fourth Amendment suppression
analysis).
274. A Franks analysis refers to the case Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S.
154 (1978). Franks was decided on constitutional grounds. See id. at 155-56.
275. See, e.g., United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 549-51 (D.C. Cir.
2010); United States v. Rice, 478 F.3d 704, 716-18 (6th Cir. 2007) (Bell, C.J.,
dissenting); United States v. Shryock, 342 F.3d 948, 976-77 (9th Cir. 2003);
United States v. Green, 175 F.3d 822, 828 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 663-65 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Guerra-Marez,
928 F.2d 665, 669-71 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Cole, 807 F.2d 262,
267-68 (1st Cir. 1986); United States v. Ippolito, 774 F.2d 1482, 1485 (9th Cir.
1985). Another circuit has expressly refrained from deciding this issue. See
United States v. Heilman, 377 F. App’x 157, 177 (3d Cir. 2010).
276. See United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH), 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *69-94 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010), aff’d, 719 F.3d 139
(2d Cir. 2013).
277. See, e.g., United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 146 (2d Cir.
2013) (quoting United States v. Canfield, 212 F.3d 713, 717–18 (2d Cir. 2000);
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Surprisingly, almost none of the cases that have used this
standard have discussed it within the context of the
suppression analysis from Giordano and its progeny. The
leading case on this issue in the First Circuit, for example, cites
Giordano once, but does so for a proposition unrelated to the
issue of suppression.278 Likewise, the first case from the Ninth
Circuit applying this standard only mentions Giordano once in
passing,279 while at least three other cases from that circuit
applying this standard fail to directly cite to Giordano at all.280
Similar statements can be made with respect to decisions from
the Fifth Circuit,281 the Second Circuit,282 the Third Circuit,283
see also United States v. Small, 423 F.3d 1164, 1172 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Under
[the Franks] standard, the defendant must show that any misstatements
were made knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly, and that the erroneous
information was material to the district court’s finding of necessity.”).
278. See Cole, 807 F.2d at 267-68 (discussing Giordano in relation to
finding that a judge needs to make prior to authorizing a wiretap).
279. See Ippolito, 774 F.2d at 1486. The court in Ippolito did state,
however, that
[b]ecause the challenged statements in the wiretap
application at issue deal with the necessity or alternative
methods requirement for obtaining a wiretap, it is first
necessary to determine whether necessity is an essential,
congressionally warranted requirement, and not merely a
factor meant to inform the issuing judge of the difficulties
involved in the use of conventional techniques.
Id. at 1485 (quoting United States v. Pacheco, 489 F.2d 554, 565 (5th Cir.
1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted). This sounds in some respects
similar to a Giordano analysis.
280. See Shryock, 342 F.2d at 976-77; United States v. Blackmon, 273
F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Bennett, 219 F.3d 1117,
1121-26 (9th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462,
1472-73 (9th Cir. 1987) (not citing Giordano and concluding that “the specific
facts withheld from the issuing judge about this particular investigation
reveal that traditional techniques could have led to the successful infiltration
of the entire enterprise.”).
281. See United States v. Guerra-Marez, 928 F.2d 665, 669-71 (5th Cir.
1991) (not citing Giordano).
282. See United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 663-65 (2d Cir. 1997)
(discussing the necessity requirement without a Giordano analysis); United
States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 231 (2d Cir. 1990) (discussing suppression for
failure to abide by the necessity requirement but without discussing
Giordano), abrogation recognized by United States v. Al Jaber, 436 F. App’x
9, 12 (2d Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112, 1126-27
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the Sixth Circuit,284 the D.C. Circuit,285 and the Tenth
Circuit.286 The application of Giordano to the necessity
requirements of Title III was directly addressed by the Second
Circuit in Rajaratnam, with the court ultimately concluding
that Giordano did not preclude the application of a Franks
analysis to the necessity requirement.287 The Court reached
this conclusion, however, largely by relying on previous case
law that did not fully analyze the application of Giordano.288
At least one circuit has recognized the heavier burden that
Title III places on the government vis-à-vis the Fourth
Amendment. In United States v. Rice,289 the court adhered
more closely to the Giordano line of reasoning. The Sixth
Circuit, after citing to Giordano, stated that “[b]ecause the
necessity requirement is a component of Title III, and because
suppression is the appropriate remedy for a violation under
Title III, where a warrant application does not meet the
necessity requirement, the fruits of any evidence obtained
through that warrant must be suppressed.”290 The court then

(2d Cir. 1993) (discussing the application of the Franks analysis to Title III’s
“roving” wiretap requirements, and citing to § 2518(10)(a) but failing to
mention Giordano), abrogation recognized by United States v. Galpin, No. 114808-cr., 2013 WL 3185299, at *7 (2d Cir. 2013).
283. See United States v. Heilman, 377 F. App’x 157, 177 (3d Cir. 2010)
(noting that most circuits have adopted Franks analysis in the context of the
necessity requirement, refusing to address the issue because the defendant
had failed to even make a preliminary showing under Franks, and not
mentioning Giordano).
284. See United States v. Stewart, 306 F.3d 295, 304-05 (6th Cir. 2002)
(stating that Franks applied to challenges based on the necessity
requirement without discussion and without citing Giordano); see also United
States v. Poulsen, 655 F.3d 492, 503-05 (6th Cir. 2011) (same); United States
v. Rice, 478 F.3d 704, 716-18 (6th Cir. 2007) (Bell, C.J., dissenting) (same).
285. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 549-51 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (applying Franks to a necessity challenge without citing to Giordano or
its progeny).
286. See United States v. Small, 423 F.3d 1164, 1172-73 (10th Cir. 2005)
(failing to cite Giordano); see also United States v. Green, 175 F.3d 822, 82829 (10th Cir. 1999) (same).
287. United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 152 (2d Cir. 2013).
288. Id. at 151-52 (citing United States v. Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112, 1126
(2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641 (2d Cir. 1997)); see also
id. at 152 n.16 (collecting cases).
289. 478 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2007).
290. Id. at 710.
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performed a Franks analysis and “reformed [the warrant
application] for its factual deficiencies,” by simply ignoring the
false information.291 Importantly, however, the Rice court then
went on to reject the Government’s argument that the wiretap
evidence, even if obtained in violation of Title III, should
nevertheless be admitted based on the good faith exception of
United States v. Leon.292 Rather, the court concluded that “the
good-faith exception to the warrant requirement is not
applicable to warrants obtained pursuant to Title III” based
upon both the statute’s text and legislative history.293 On this
point, the court reasoned: (i) “[t]he statute is clear on its face
and does not provide for any exception”; (ii) Leon was decided
sixteen years after the passage of Title III and therefore
“Congress obviously could not know that Fourth Amendment
search and seizure law would embrace a good-faith exception”;
and (iii) in contrast to the exclusionary rule “Congress has
already balanced the social costs and benefits and has provided
that suppression is the sole remedy for violations of the
statute.”294 Although the court still utilized a Franks analysis
291. Id. at 711.
292. 468 U.S. 897 (1984); Rice, 478 F.3d at 711-14.
293. Rice, 478 F.3d at 711. At least three other circuits have reached a
different conclusion. See United States v. Brewer, 204 F. App’x 205, 208 (4th
Cir. 2006); United States v. Moore, 41 F.3d 370, 376-77 (8th Cir.1994); United
States v. Malekzadeh, 855 F.2d 1492, 1497 (11th Cir. 1988); see also United
States v. Solomonyan, 451 F. Supp. 2d 626, 628 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); United
States v. Mullen, 451 F. Supp. 2d 509, 530-31 (W.D.N.Y. 2006). In United
States v. Heilman, 377 F. App’x 157 (3d Cir. 2010), the Third Circuit made
note of this split authority and specifically declined to decide whether there
was a good-faith exception to the necessity requirement. Id. at 185 n.21.
294. Rice, 478 F.3d at 713. In another case, the Ninth Circuit declared
that there is a two-step approach to reviewing necessity determinations, the
first step of which entails “review[ing] de novo whether the application for
wiretapping was submitted in compliance with 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c).”
United States v. Garcia-Villalba, 585 F.3d 1223, 1228 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting
United States v. McGuire, 307 F.3d 1192, 1197 (9th Cir. 2002)). This
standard, however, appears only to apply where only the facial sufficiency of
the warrant application is challenged and not its factual validity. See United
States v. Rivera, 527 F.3d 891, 898 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In reviewing whether an
affidavit contains a full and complete statement of facts in compliance with §
2518(1)(c), we assess whether the affidavit attests that adequate
investigative tactics were exhausted before the wiretap order was sought or
that such methods reasonably appeared unlikely to success or too
dangerous.”) (reaffirming United States v. Ippolito, 774 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir.
1985)); see also Garcia-Villalba, 585 F.3d at 1227-35 (not presenting a
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for the necessity requirement, its reasoning on the issue of a
good-faith exception is more closely aligned with the reasoning
underpinning Giordano.295
Although at least one court has shown hints of adopting a
more Giordano-like analysis, the Sixth Circuit’s decision in
Rice failed to fully repudiated the applicability of Franks to the
necessity requirement. Applying a Franks analysis to the
necessity requirement shifts the burden of proving necessity
away from the government and onto the defendant challenging
the warrant: defendants must now prove falsity or omission,
and that the information is material. For example, courts have
consistently concluded that where the government applies for
an electronic surveillance order, it “must overcome the
statutory presumption against granting a wiretap application
by showing necessity.”296 In other words, the government has
the burden of establishing the necessity of a wiretap to its
investigation. But, applying a Franks analysis to the necessity
requirement has the effect of taking the burden of proof on the
issue of necessity away from the government. Under Franks, a
defendant has the burden of first proving the knowing,
intentional, or reckless falsity of the affidavit, and then they
have the additional burden of proving that this false or omitted
information was material to the court’s determination of

challenge to the factual statements in the warrant application); McGuire, 307
F.3d at 1197 (same).
295. For example, the argument that Leon is not applicable to Title III
because it was decided years after Title III’s adoption can also be applied to
Franks. See Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 8-9, United States v.
Rajaratnam, No. 11-4416-cr, 2013 WL 3155848, at *1 (2d Cir. June 24, 2013)
(No. 11-4416-cr), 2012 WL 1903399, at *8-9 (“Giordano predates Franks
because Title III predates Franks. And that means that the Congress that
adopted Title III could not possibly have intended for its straightforward
statutory text to be so sweepingly countermanded by a Franks doctrine of
which it had never heard.”). This argument, however, has been rejected by
the Second Circuit. See Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d at 152; see also United States v.
Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112, 1126 (2d Cir. 1993).
296. Ippolito, 774 F.2d at 1486 (citations omitted). This is a different
question from the question of who has the burden of proof in overturning a
district court order granting a wiretap warrant after the court has made a
finding of necessity. See, e.g., United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184
(RJH), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *87 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010) (citing
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978)), aff’d, 719 F.3d 139 (2d Cir.
2013).
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necessity.297 Thus, the government can secure a wiretap
warrant by recklessly or intentionally failing to provide a “full
and complete statement” establishing necessity and then shift
the burden to the defendant to essentially disprove necessity
based upon what a “full and complete statement” would
otherwise reveal. This weakens the statutory purpose of the
necessity requirement, which is to discourage use of wiretaps
as a matter of course. This burden shift is thus likely to
aggravate the trend towards increased use of wiretaps by law
enforcement.
V. Re-Establishing Privacy as a Cardinal Principle Through
Vigorous Judicial Enforcement of Title III’s Substantive
Requirements
With the expanded use of wiretaps in white-collar
prosecutions, it becomes more important than ever for the
judiciary to act as a bulwark against prosecutors seeking to
engage in covert electronic surveillance beyond what Congress
sought to permit. By more vigorously enforcing the
requirements of Title III that are meant to limit the use of
wiretaps, courts can rebalance privacy and law-enforcement
concerns more in line with congressional intent. Several recent
developments in white-collar criminal prosecutions indicate
two important changes are needed. First, courts must more
strictly enforce the predicate offense requirement by refocusing
on the limitations imposed on use of the plain-view exception.
Courts can accomplish this through closer supervision of the
“subsequent application” process or, alternatively, courts could
allow criminal defendants to more easily challenge the
government’s good faith application of the plain-view exception
through an evidentiary hearing or by adopting a burdenshifting analysis. Second, courts must hold the government to
its burden of establishing necessity through strictly enforcing
the government’s obligation to provide a “full and complete
statement” of investigatory facts indicating that a wiretap is
necessary in a given case. Courts must reject the continuing
use of a constitutionally-based Franks analysis to the necessity
297. See, e.g., Rajaratnam, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *70.
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requirement because this analysis weakens statutory
protections. In reasserting its authority by adopting these
changes, the judiciary can once again buttress against
excessive wiretap use by prosecutors as Congress originally
intended when it enacted Title III.

A. Restraining the Plain-View Exception to the Predicate
Offense Requirement
A number of statutory requirements contained in Title III
are specifically meant to discourage the use of wiretaps as a
matter of course by law enforcement. The predicate offense
requirement is one of these requirements.298 As discussed
above, however, the predicate offense requirement, along with
its restrictive force, is in danger of becoming a dead letter.299 In
order to breathe new life into this requirement’s ability to
adequately protect privacy interests, the plain-view exception
must be limited in some manner. To appropriately achieve this
limitation, judicial supervision over wiretap investigations
must be increased or, alternatively, after some minimal
showing by the defendant, the burden must be placed on the
government to justify its assertion of good faith where it seeks
to use Title III’s plain-view provision.
1. The Judicial Supervision Approach
One possible avenue to appropriately limit excessive use of
wiretaps would be to increase judicial supervision over the
ongoing wiretap investigation. This can be done fully in line
with the statutory text, but several hurdles exist that make
this approach unlikely to succeed.
First, it must be noted that the plain-view exception to the
predicate offense requirement is statutorily based.300 As such,
it cannot be interpreted so narrowly as to be effectively read
out of the statute itself. This does not mean, however, that the
298. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2012).
299. See supra Parts III.B.1, IV.A.
300. See 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5).
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use of this exception cannot be restricted at all. Congress itself
thought that certain restrictions were appropriate by providing
that any “plain view” evidence obtained during a wiretap
investigation, if it is to be used at trial, must be brought to the
a judge’s attention “as soon as practicable.”301 Congress further
believed that this subsequent application should establish the
following:
[i] that the original order was lawfully obtained,
[ii] that [the original order] was sought in good
faith and not as a subterfuge search, and [iii]
that the [otherwise intercepted] communication
was in fact incidentally intercepted during the
course of a lawfully executed order.302
Courts could more appropriately enforce this provision in
accordance with congressional intent by placing increased
emphasis on the requirement that an investigative officer
apply to use this evidence in a subsequent proceeding “as soon
as practicable.” By using the phrase “as soon as practicable,”
Congress implicitly suggested that the timing of this
application was an important consideration.303 Restricting the
time frame in which such an application can be made would
both fully comply with the statutory mandate and allow courts
greater supervision over ongoing wiretap intercepts.
Close judicial supervision of ongoing electronic surveillance
was specifically envisioned by Congress.304 In passing Title III,
Congress made an explicit congressional finding that “[t]o
safeguard the privacy of innocent persons, the interception of
[protected] communications . . . should remain under the
control and supervision of the authorizing court.”305 This same

301. See id.
302. S. Rep. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112,
2189.
303. See 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5).
304. See, e.g., United States v. Gigante, 538 F.2d 502, 503 (2d Cir. 1976)
(“Congress, in enacting Title III . . . prescribed specific and detailed
procedures to ensure careful judicial scrutiny of the conduct of electronic
surveillance and the integrity of its fruits.”).
305. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets (Wiretap) Act of 1968,
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intent is shown in other statutory provisions of Title III, such
as the re-authorization and extension provisions of §§
2518(1)(f)306 and 2518(5).307
Under the increased judicial supervision approach,
although no bright-line rule would need to be adopted, a
subsequent application to use evidence obtained by wiretap at
trial should be submitted within a period of a few days. By
permitting increased judicial supervision such as this, a judge
can more accurately determine whether Title III is being used
as a mere subterfuge to investigate a non-Title III offense. Put
differently, being presented with the “plain view” evidence
derived from wiretap intercepts on an ongoing basis allows a
court to make a more reasoned determination of whether the
primary focus of an investigation is on a Title III predicate
offense or on a non-Title III offense. For example, if a wiretap
intercepts troves of evidence concerning insider trading, but
only very limited evidence of wire fraud, a judge is in a better
position to determine whether wire fraud is being used as a
mere gateway to investigate insider trading. In this situation, a
judge may appropriately decide that the securities fraud
investigation is the primary purpose of the wiretap
investigation and revoke the issued warrant or refuse to extend
it.
There are several major drawbacks to this approach. First,
and perhaps most importantly, as Judge Holwell noted in the
Rajaratnam case, the evidence used to prosecute wire fraud
and the evidence used to prosecute a non-predicate offense,
such as securities fraud, is often one and the same.308 There is
rarely a clear distinction between evidence indicative of
securities fraud scheme that is carried out over interstate wires
and evidence indicative of wire fraud. It would likely be
difficult for a judge to discern the government’s true intent at
this stage of the investigation. It is not until textual, objective
clues emerge later on that the government’s investigatory
Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, § 801(d), 82 Stat. 197, 211 (1968).
306. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(f).
307. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5).
308. See United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH), 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010), aff’d, 719 F.3d 139 (2d
Cir. 2013).
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intent becomes clearer.
There are also other problems with this approach that
would likely undercut its effectiveness. For instance, allowing
only a short period of time between intercept and the
subsequent application to use this evidence means that the
subsequent application would, in most cases, be made prior to
an indictment. Therefore, this subsequent application would be
submitted ex parte and the suspect would not have an adequate
opportunity to contest it prior to it being approved by a court.
Although this raises serious due process concerns, there may
be ways that these concerns may be avoided or minimized. One
possible approach would be to allow a challenge to this
subsequent application after it has been approved. This way,
the judicial approval of the subsequent application would act
much like a typical search warrant. But because a judge’s
decision that is not based on a strict question of law is
generally afforded considerable deference on review, this
decision would likely be given a presumption of validity and the
burden would be on the defendant to attack its veracity in some
regard. A defendant would therefore attack this approval in the
same or a similar manner as the defendants in Rajaratnam
did, although such defendants would have to overcome a higher
burden due to the presumption of validity afforded to this
earlier decision. Another possible disadvantage to this
approach is that it blurs the line between the prosecution and
the judiciary. Courts are often apprehensive to closely
scrutinize an ongoing investigation for fear of wading into
areas better left to prosecutorial discretion.309 It therefore
remains unclear whether courts would embrace this
supervisory power vigorously enough to adequately restrict the
use of wiretaps. To date, courts have shown little willingness to
reasonably restrict the use of § 2517(5)’s plain-view
exception,310 and there is no indication that courts would do so
309. See generally Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor:
Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 408
(2001) (“The Supreme Court has consistently upheld the broad exercise of
prosecutorial discretion—a power that affords prosecutors far-reaching
control over the outcome of criminal cases.”). Davis asserts in the context of
wiretaps that “Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests that the Court will
continue to defer to prosecutorial discretion.” Id. at 460.
310. See supra Part IV.A.
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under this alternative approach. Ultimately, any approach
relying on closer judicial supervision of an ongoing
investigation is likely to prove ineffective.
2. The Burden Approach
A more reasonable and practical approach to restricting
wiretap use to appropriate cases would be for courts to focus
more heavily on whether the government acted in good faith,
which is a necessary requirement to make use of the plain-view
exception.311 To appropriately limit the over-use of wiretaps,
this would require courts to place the greatest burden on the
government to justify its good faith, as opposed to placing the
greatest burden on the defendant to challenge the
government’s good faith. As discussed above, the plain-view
exception has been interpreted in such a way so as to
effectively create a presumption of good faith on behalf of the
government that, under most circumstances, is nearly
impossible for a criminal defendant to overcome.312 There are
two possible standards courts could adopt to reverse this trend:
first, courts could permit an evidentiary hearing into the
government’s good faith once a defendant makes an initial
showing justifying such a hearing; and second, courts could
adopt a burden-shifting analysis that forces the government to
prove its good faith application of the plain-view exception after
a simple prima facie showing by the defendant.
Under the evidentiary-hearing approach, a defendant
would have the initial burden to establish his or her right to
such a hearing. This would require the defendant to reasonably
call into doubt whether the primary purpose of the wiretap
application was to investigate a Title III predicate offense—i.e.,
a defendant must present specific, articulable reasons to
believe that the government is using Title III as a subterfuge to
investigate a non-predicate criminal offense. This initial
311. See United States v. Baranek, 903 F.2d 1068, 1070 (6th Cir. 1990);
see also Derik T. Fettig, When "Good Faith" Makes Good Sense: Applying
Leon's Exception to the Exclusionary Rule to the Government's Reasonable
Reliance on Title III Wiretap Orders, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 373, 408-09 (2012)
(discussing the “good faith” exception).
312. See supra Part IV.A.
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burden is justified in order to protect the government from
unwarranted fishing expeditions by defendants seeking to
explore the government’s
investigation for
reasons
unassociated with challenging the wiretap warrant. Due to the
difficulty involved with presenting objective proof that the
government acted in bad faith, a relatively low standard would
be appropriate.
Any number of different standards could be adopted in this
regard. One reasonable standard justifying an evidentiary
hearing is as follows: first, the defendant would have to (1)
show that the government knew that it would likely uncover
evidence of a non-Title III offense, and (2) demonstrate some
articulable reason to call into question whether the
government’s primary intent in using wiretaps was to
investigate a Title III offense. This standard appropriately
focuses on what the government knew at the time of its
warrant application and on whether the government intended
to leverage this knowledge by abusing Title III.
This standard for establishing a right to an evidentiary
hearing has several advantages. To begin, this approach
maintains the “incidental” standard adopted by the
Rajaratnam court and many others.313 It rejects, as many
courts have already done, the notion that an interception must
be “inadvertent” by requiring a showing greater than that
which establishes that the interception of “plain view” evidence
was an anticipated consequence.314 In rejecting the
“inadvertent” standard, the district court in Rajaratnam stated
that such a standard would “bar the government from using
wiretaps for wire fraud investigations whenever the fraud
concerns securities.”315 Under this suggested standard,
however, such a fear should be alleviated.
At the same time, this standard rejects the unjustified
result that the more blatant the government is in disclosing
that it intends to uncover evidence of other non-predicate
313. See United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH), 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 143175, *11-19 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010) (collecting cases), aff’d,
719 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2013); see also supra note 233 and accompanying text.
314. See, e.g., United States v. McKinnon, 721 F.2d 19, 22-23 (1st Cir.
1983).
315. See Rajaratnam, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *19.
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crimes the more successful it will be in using this evidence at
trial. The government would therefore be presented with a
choice; it could choose to disclose its knowledge that it will
likely intercept “plain view” evidence of other crimes (in the
warrant application itself), in which case a defendant can
establish the first prong necessary to obtain an evidentiary
hearing. Alternatively, the government could hide this fact.
Ethical concerns aside, the government would be discouraged
from concealing this knowledge for two additional reasons.
First, there are added protections within the statute likely to
expose this deception. For example, Title III requires that
when a wiretap warrant is extended beyond thirty days, the
government must provide “a statement setting forth the results
thus far obtained from the interception.”316 If the government
charges the defendant with a non-Title III offense, but intends
to use evidence not disclosed in subsequent applications, the
government’s concealment becomes obvious. Second, this type
of deception, if it is discovered, is in and of itself strong
evidence of the bad faith likely to obviate the need for an
evidentiary hearing.317
This standard for securing an evidentiary hearing also has
the advantage of placing primary importance on the
government’s intent. After establishing that the government is
aware that it will likely intercept evidence of a non-predicate
crime, the standard for challenging the government’s primary
purpose of the wiretap investigation should be relatively low.
But as in other similar contexts, conclusory allegations should
be rejected, and a defendant should have to point to specific,
articulable reasons for doubting the government’s primary
purpose. The Rajaratnam court acknowledged that charging a
defendant with a Title III predicate offense may be evidence of
good faith, but it refused to accept the contention that not
charging a defendant with a predicate offense is evidence of

316. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(f) (2012).
317. See, e.g., United States v. Goffer, No. 11-3591-cr(L), 2013 WL
3285115, at *5 (2d Cir. July 1, 2013) (“This representation [that evidence of
other, non-predicate-offense crimes would likely be uncovered in using a
wiretap] ensured that the wiretaps were not obtained as a ‘subterfuge’ or to
surreptitiously investigate crimes other than those about which they
informed the court.”).
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bad faith.318 Under the standard discussed above, however,
failing to charge a defendant would be sufficient evidence to
justify an evidentiary hearing. This is important because not
charging a defendant with a Title III offense is often the only
objective evidence a defendant will have to question the
government’s true intent. That is not to say, however, that
other specific, articulable reasons could not be presented. Of
course, courts should not be in the position of encouraging
prosecutors to over-charge a defendant for acts that the
prosecutor, within his or her discretion, truly believes should
not be charged as certain offenses. At the same time, however,
permitting an evidentiary hearing under these circumstances
would appropriately place the government in the position to
justify its use of “plain view” evidence. As Judge Holwell
recognized, “[t]he government’s charging decisions depend on a
variety of factors.”319 But, if the government is truly acting in
good faith, government agents should easily be able to
articulate its reasons for charging a defendant with a non-Title
III predicate offense, while at the same time not charging the
defendant with the underlying offense justifying the use of a
wiretap.
Under this approach, if after an evidentiary hearing the
court believes by a preponderance of the evidence that the
government was primarily interested in investigating a nonTitle III offense, such as securities fraud, then evidence derived
from the wiretap warrant should be suppressed. In such a
situation, the third prong of § 2518(10)(a) would apply, which
permits suppression where “the interception was not made in
conformity with the order of authorization or approval.”320 A
wiretap warrant implicitly authorizes the incidental intercept
of “plain view” evidence. If a wiretap intercept of “plain view”
evidence is not done “incidentally,” however, it does not
comport with the judicial authorization. In addition,
suppression may also be required under the first prong of §
2518(10)(a).321 As discussed above, this section authorizes

318.
319.
320.
321.

See Rajaratnam, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *13 n.5.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a)(iii).
Id. at § 2518(10)(a)(i)
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suppression where there has been a failure to comply with a
substantive statutory provision meant to limit the use of
wiretaps.322 Arguably, if the primary purpose of using a
wiretap is to investigate a non-predicate offense, the predicate
offense requirement itself is not adequately complied with.
An alternative to the evidentiary-hearing approach would
be to adopt a burden-shifting analysis. In many ways, this
approach would be similar to the evidentiary-hearing approach.
Pursuant to this standard, a defendant would first have the
obligation to make a prima facie case that the government was
acting in bad faith. Therefore, the defendant would have to
present evidence that (1) the government knew it was likely to
intercept “plain view” evidence of additional crimes, and (2)
this was the government’s primary purpose in using a wiretap.
A standard similar to that which would warrant an evidentiary
hearing under that alternative approach would also be
appropriate here. If a defendant succeeds in presenting a prima
facie case that calls into question whether the government
acted in good faith through the two criteria above, the burden
would then shift to the government to come forward with
evidence that it was primarily, or at least equally, interested in
investigating the crime justifying the use of a wiretap. If the
government cannot make such a showing, the wiretap evidence
should be suppressed. If the government satisfies this burden,
then the burden would again shift back to the defendant to
prove that the government’s justification is pretextual. The
level of proof necessary to establish that the government’s
explanation was pretextual would be greater than that
required to establish a prima facie case.
Both the evidentiary-hearing and burden-shifting
approaches have the advantage of placing the greatest burden
on the government (after a small initial burden is overcome by
the defendant). The statute itself envisions that the
government would have the burden of establishing the
application of the plain-view exception of § 2517(5).323 Most
obviously, Title III permits the use of this evidence only where
it is “authorized or approved by a judge of competent

322. See supra Part IV.B.
323. See 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5).
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jurisdiction where such judge finds on subsequent application
that the contents were otherwise intercepted in accordance
with the provisions of this chapter.”324 By requiring the
government to make this application, Title III implicitly places
the burden on the government to prove the applicability of this
exception. Legislative history supports this interpretation: “[a]
subsequent application would include a showing that” this
exception was properly used.325
From a doctrinal standpoint, the evidentiary-hearing and
the burden-shifting approaches would be very similar. In
practice, there are benefits and drawbacks to either approach.
For example, an evidentiary-hearing approach permits more
accurate fact-finding because a defendant is directly allowed to
obtain evidence through cross-examination. In contrast, the
burden-shifting approach offers the defendant less opportunity
to question government witnesses or obtain documents. Of
course, these approaches are simply suggestions, and courts
can ultimately combine these approaches or find other
adequate ways to guard against the abuse of Title III.
All of this being said, one could argue that securities-fraud
and other types of white-collar criminal schemes are exactly
the type of crimes that Congress envisioned would be
investigated using covert electronic surveillance. In passing
Title III, Congress found that “[o]rganized criminals make
extensive use of wire and oral communications in their
criminal activity” and that “[t]he interception of such
communications . . . is an indispensable aid to law enforcement
and the administration of justice.”326 Those engaging in an
insider-trading scheme, where one party passes information to
another so that they may unlawfully trade on this inside
knowledge, are certainly “organized criminals,” although
perhaps not in the traditional sense of being associated with
mafia activity. Indeed, since the late 1960s, Congress has
continuously added to the list of predicate offenses, indicating

324. See id.
325. S. Rep. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112,
2189 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
326. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets (Wiretap) Act of 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, § 801(c), 82 Stat. 197, 211 (1968).
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an expansive trend.327 Ultimately, however, adding securities
fraud to the list of predicate offenses is a job for Congress, and
the restrictions placed on what types of crimes may be
investigated using wiretaps must be enforced by the courts. It
is not the province of our judicial system to weaken the
protections for individual privacy enacted by Congress.
In the end, there are numerous possible approaches courts
could adopt to adequately protect against Title III becoming a
subterfuge through which prosecutors and other government
authorities investigate non-predicate offenses: courts could
increase judicial supervision over wiretap intercepts on an
ongoing basis, adopt one of several approaches permitting a
criminal defendant to more easily challenge the government’s
assertion of good faith, adopt a mix of these approaches, or
develop other alternatives. The primary focus of these efforts,
however, almost certainly must be on limiting the use of the
plain-view exception of § 2517(5).328 By limiting the application
of this exception, privacy interests will be better protected by
discouraging government authorities from using wiretaps as a
matter of course.
B. A Return to the Giordano Standard and Strict Compliance
With the Necessity Requirement
In addition to breathing new life into the limitations of the
plain-view exception to the predicate offense requirement,
courts must also adequately enforce the requirement that the
government provide a “full and complete statement” of the facts
indicating that a wiretap is necessary.329 As recent cases
indicate, courts have essentially been ignoring controlling
Supreme Court precedent dating back to the 1970s in
determining whether the government has satisfied its burden

327. See, e.g., Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets (Wiretap) Act of
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, § 801(c), 82 Stat. 197, 211 (1968); Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. VIII, IX, XI, §§ 810, 902(a),
1103, 84 Stat. 924, 936, 940, 941, 947, 952, 959 (1970); Border Tunnel
Prevention Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-127, § 4, 126 Stat. 370, 371 (2012); cf.
18 U.S.C. § 2516(1).
328. See 18 U.S.C. 2517(5).
329. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b).
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of establishing the necessity of using a wiretap.330 By
inappropriately applying a constitutional standard to an
entirely
statutorily-created
requirement,
courts
have
unjustifiably shifted the burden to criminal defendants to
disprove necessity, which allows the government to abuse the
wiretap application process. Rather than appropriately placing
the burden of proof on the government to establish the
necessity of a wiretap, applying a Franks analysis shifts the
burden to a criminal defendant to prove (1) that the
government did not provide a “full and complete statement” in
knowing, intentional, or reckless disregard of its obligations
and (2) that the falsity or omission at issue was material to the
issuing judge’s determination of necessity.331 This threatens the
delicate balance between privacy and law-enforcement
interests that Congress initially sought to achieve.332 A return
to a more demanding standard based upon the statutory text is
required to once again achieve the appropriate balance.
As the Supreme Court in Giordano counseled, suppression
of a wiretap secured under Title III does not turn upon Fourth
Amendment standards, but rather, suppression should always
be determined on the basis of the statutory text.333 Moreover, in
Chavez the Court noted that “strict adherence” to Title III’s
requirements should be demanded.334 Although it is entirely
appropriate to apply certain constitutional standards within
the framework of Title III—e.g., the standard for probable
cause—this is only because the statutory text itself and the
legislative history of Title III provides for the application of
these standards.335 Recently, however, courts have been
applying the constitutional standard for the sufficiency of a
warrant affidavit to the non-constitutionally based
requirement of necessity.336 This threatens the balance
330. See supra Part VI.
331. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978).
332. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
333. United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 524 (1974) (Suppression
under Title III “does not turn on the judicially fashioned exclusionary rule
aimed at deterring violations of Fourth Amendment rights, but upon the
provisions of Title III.”).
334. See United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 580 (1974).
335. See Giordano, 416 U.S. at 527.
336. See supra note 25 and accompanying text; see also supra Part
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Congress sought to achieve in passing Title III. As the Fourth
Circuit warned in a slightly different context, “In the fastdeveloping area of communications technology, courts should
be cautious not to wield the amorphous [Fourth Amendment]
standard in a manner that nullifies the balance between
privacy rights and law enforcement needs struck by Congress
in Title III.”337
To avoid interfering with the balance Congress sought in
passing Title III, courts should focus more on whether the
government succeeded or failed in satisfying the statutory
requirement of providing “a full and complete statement” to the
issuing judge338 rather than focusing on whether the
government would be able to establish the appropriateness of a
warrant despite factual misrepresentations or omissions—a
primary concern under a Fourth Amendment challenge. This is
a somewhat subtle change, but a nevertheless important one.
By slightly reframing the appropriate question to answer—
focusing more on whether the government satisfied its initial
statutory burden of being both forthright and honest, rather
than on what a theoretically corrected affidavit would have
looked like—courts can adhere more closely to the purposes
underpinning Title III and better protect individual privacy.
It is important to note that, in addition to applying a
Franks analysis to the issue of necessity, courts have also
adopted a Franks analysis in the context of Title III’s probable
cause requirements.339 This, however, is unsurprising, and it is
likely a correct application of a constitutional doctrine within
the context of Title III. After all, § 2518(10)(a)(i) permits
suppression for violations of the Fourth Amendment,340 and the
legislative history of Title III also indicates that § 2518(10)(a)
was meant to “largely reflect[] existing law.”341 The necessity

III.B.3.
337. In re Askin, 47 F.3d 100, 105-06 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967)).
338. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (2012).
339. See, e.g., United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH), 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *23-52 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010).
340. See United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 527 (1974).
341. See id. at 529 n.17 (quoting S. Rep. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in
1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2182).
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requirement, however, is not a requirement under the Fourth
Amendment and therefore did not represent “existing law” at
the time of its adoption. Thus, it makes little sense to take a
statutory requirement and supplant it with a constitutional
doctrine in this context. This is especially true when considered
against the underlying purpose of the necessity requirement
and Title III in general.
In addressing the application of a Giordano analysis to the
necessity requirement, the Second Circuit recently reasoned,
relying on language from the legislative history of Title III,
that because Title III “was not intended ‘generally to press the
scope of the suppression role beyond [then current] search and
seizure law,’” cases such as Franks and United States v. Leon
that were decided after the passage of Title III could apply to
the statute’s provisions.342 This analysis, however, completely
ignores the primary lesson taught by Giordano—that
suppression under Title III “does not turn on the judicially
fashioned exclusionary rule aimed at deterring violations of
Fourth Amendment rights, but upon the provisions of Title III .
. . .”343 The Giordano court specifically addressed the language
in the legislative history relied upon the Second Circuit. The
Supreme Court noted that this language seemed to be in
conflict with other language in the legislative history indicating
that § 2518(10)(a) was intended “to guarantee that the
standards of [Title III] will sharply curtail the unlawful
interception of wire and oral communications.”344 Based on
both of these legislative statements, the Court concluded that
“it would not extend existing search-and-seizure law for
Congress to provide for the suppression of evidence obtained in
violation of explicit statutory prohibitions.”345 The Rajaratnam

342. United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 152 (2d Cir. 2013)
(quoting S. Rep. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112,
2185).
343. Giordano, 416 U.S. at 524; see also Adams v. City of Battle Creek,
250 F.3d 980, 986 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Congress made [Title III] the primary
vehicle by which to address violations of privacy interests in the
communications field. . . . All such constitutional questions are
pretermitted.”).
344. Giordano, 416 U.S. at 528 (internal quotation and citations
omitted).
345. Id.
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court ignored the Supreme Court’s reconciliation of the
legislative history. Moreover, the Second Circuit’s analysis
further ignored an important lesson from Chavez: that “strict
adherence” to the statutory text should be mandated.346
The Rajarantam court’s conclusory reasoning was also
applied in an earlier Second Circuit case, United States v.
Bianco,347 which the Rajaratnam court cited to approvingly.348
In Bianco, the court again ignored the main precept of
Giordano and further reasoned that “[i]f anything, Franks
enhances the protection of the defendants, by applying to the
wiretap statute an important constitutional principle that has
been accepted by all courts.”349 Unexplained, however, is how
this can possibly increase the protection of a defendant by
applying this standard under Title III, when the defendant is
protected by Franks regardless of the existence of Title III.
Moreover, as noted by the Second Circuit in Rajaratnam, the
Franks decision actually “narrowed the circumstances in which
. . . [courts] apply the exclusionary rule,” it does not expand
protections available to defendants.350
One of the purposes of adopting Title III was to provide
protections greater than those afforded by the Fourth
Amendment. For example, Congress provided for, inter alia,
heightened
particularity
requirements,
a
necessity
requirement, minimization requirements, and requirements
meant to hold public officials accountable for excessive wiretap
use.351 The Supreme Court has specifically stated that the
necessity requirement “is simply designed to assure that
wiretapping is not resorted to in situations where traditional
investigative techniques would suffice to expose the crime.”352

346. United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 580 (1974).
347. 998 F.2d 1112, 1126 (2d Cir. 1993), abrogated on other grounds by
Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004).
348. United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 151-52 (2d Cir. 2013).
349. Bianco, 998 F.2d at 1126.
350. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d at 152 (quoting Bianco, 998 F.2d at 1126).
351. See generally supra Part III.
352. United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S 143, 153 n.12 (1974) (citation
omitted); see also United States v. Martinez, 588 F.2d 1227, 1232 (9th Cir.
1978) (“Th[e] ‘necessity’ requirement exists to limit the use of wiretaps
because of their highly intrusive nature and to ‘assure that wiretapping is not
resorted to in situations where traditional investigative techniques would
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Because the necessity requirement is meant to restrict the use
of wiretaps to appropriate cases, it is the very type of
requirement that the Giordano Court deemed to have a
“central role in the statutory scheme.”353 This is in contrast to
the probable cause requirements of Title III, which the
government would have to comply with regardless of whether
Title III specifically mandated it. In other words, the probable
cause requirement of Title III is not central to its legislative
purpose because any government authority applying for a
warrant—including a wiretap warrant—would have to supply
evidence of probable cause regardless of the strictures of Title
III.354 The probable cause requirements of Title III therefore do
not protect against the excessive use of wiretaps beyond what
the Federal Constitution itself prohibits. As such, the probable
cause requirement does not play a “central role in the statutory
scheme,” unlike the necessity requirement, which provides
greater protection for individual privacy than the Constitution
does.
One prerequisite to a lawful wiretap is pre-application
approval by a designated government official.355 The Giordano
court, however, also implicitly concluded that knowledgeable
approval by a judicial officer was a prerequisite for a lawful
intercept.356 In considering whether an extension order
permitting the electronic surveillance of additional suspects
were appropriate, the Court stated that:
It is urged in dissent that the information
obtained [unlawfully] may be ignored and that
the remaining evidence submitted in the
extension application was sufficient to support
the extension order. But whether or not the
application, without the facts obtained from
monitoring
Giordano’s
telephone,
would
suffice to expose the crime.” (quoting Kahn, 415 U.S. at 153 n.12)).
353. See Giordano, 416 U.S. at 527-28.
354. See supra Part III.B.2.
355. See Giordano, at 512-23.
356. See id. at 515-516 (“The mature judgment of a particular,
responsible Department of Justice official is interposed as a critical
precondition to any judicial order.”).
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independently
support
original
wiretap
authority, the Act itself forbids extensions of prior
authorizations without consideration of the
results meanwhile obtained.357
Here, the Court again placed importance on judicial prescreening. Failure to appropriately obtain judicial screening in
and of itself would be a violation of a substantive provision
central to the statutory scheme that would likely require
suppression.358 Unlike a clerical error, such as misstating the
authorizing official, as was the case in Chavez, failure to
provide a “full and complete statement” of the facts
357. Id. at 533 (emphasis added).
358. See In re Application for Interception of Wire Commc’ns, 2 F. Supp.
2d 177, 179 (D. Mass. 1998). In this case, a district court, after learning that
federal authorities had not been completely forthcoming in other wiretap
warrant applications in other cases added a handwritten requirement in the
margin of an order approving the use of a wiretap, which stated: “This order
is entered on the express representation that there are no other informants
presently known to the government knowledgeable of the matters contained
herein. If that representation is inaccurate, this order is of no force and
effect.” Id. at 177. The Government sought to have the court reconsider this
language, but the court rejected this attempt, reasoning that:
The independent determination by a judicial officer—rather
than by a law enforcement officer—of the necessity of
electronic surveillance undergirds the very constitutionality
of Title III. Indeed, it is this independent judicial
assessment that ensures that electronic surveillance is
consistent with the dictates of the Fourth Amendment. The
Court’s order makes it clear, without impugning the
integrity of the individual agents making this application,
that it will not tolerate the willful or reckless submission of
misleading or incomplete information in support of an
application to conduct electronic surveillance. The
government will not have met its burden of justifying this
intrusive technique, unless its agents have been candid with
one another and with the Court. The Court’s order further
puts the United States on notice that, should the Court
come to learn of any deception in this regard, its order
allowing such an application will have no force or effect.
Id. at 179 (internal citations omitted). Cf. United States v. Spagnuolo, 549
F.2d 705, 711 (9th Cir. 1977) (permitting an insufficient warrant application
“will effectively deny the district judge his statutory role”).
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establishing necessity does indeed “affect the fulfillment of . . .
the reviewing or approval functions required by Congress.”359
Moreover, nothing in Giordano or its progeny suggests that
the court would have recognized an exception for satisfying the
judicial approval requirement after the fact—i.e., the court
required strict compliance with the substantive provisions.360
For example, nothing in Giordano indicates that the Court
would have reached the opposite conclusion had the Attorney
General submitted an affirmation or an affidavit swearing
under oath that he would have approved the wiretap
application if it had been presented to him prior to filing. It
would have made little sense to supply a judicially-crafted
359. United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 575 (1974) (emphasis
added). The Spagnuolo court noted:
To delay the wiretap order while ordinary techniques are
employed or to undertake to educate a district judge to
enable him to appreciate their level of experience no doubt
appears to such agents as a waste of time and resources.
Their perception may be accurate, but Congress has
deprived it of decisive influence. The particularized showing
here described is necessary. The district judge, not the
agents, must determine whether the command of Congress
has been obeyed.
Spanguolo, 549 F.2d at 710-11.
360. As Professor Robert Blakey, who was actively involved in the
passage of Title III, argues in his amicus curiae brief in front of the Second
Circuit in the Rajaratnam case:
The prior judicial review that Congress found to be central
to Title III and that was determined to be indispensable to
protecting the rights enunciated in Berger and Katz is
simply impossible when the government fails to provide a
full and complete disclosure of necessity. Without that
statement, an authorizing judge cannot appropriately
determine whether a wiretap should issue. The
government’s failure to meet the statutory test constituted a
blatant violation of a provision of Title III that plays a
central role in the statutory scheme.
Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor G. Robert Blakey in Support of Appellant at
21, United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 11-4416-cr, 2013 WL 3155848, at *1 (2d
Cir. June 24, 2013) (No. 11-4416-cr), 2012 WL 453986, at *21 (quoting
Giordano, 416 U.S. at 528) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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exception such as this. The primary purpose of the statute is to
protect individual privacy against the excessive use of intrusive
surveillance measures. The harm to individual privacy
resulting from a wiretap occurs at the moment of interception;
once a private conversation is intercepted, the harm to privacy
interests has already come to fruition. Thus, permitting a post
hoc justification should not be permitted because the harm
sought to be avoided has already occurred.361 A Franks
analysis, which in practical effect allows for justification of the
necessity requirement after the interception has already
occurred, therefore does little, if anything, to protect the
relevant privacy interests. In order to give life to the purpose of
the necessity requirement, a more demanding standard is
necessary.
To a certain degree, adopting a Franks analysis for the
requirement of necessity makes sense within the structure of
the statutory scheme. In addition to supplying a “full and
complete statement” of facts establishing necessity, Title III
also demands that a wiretap applicant provide a “full and
complete statement” of the facts establishing probable cause.362
On a textual basis, this would seem to indicate that the same
standard should be applied when evaluating whether the
government
has
satisfied
its
statutory
application

361. Cf. United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 31718 (1972). The court stated:
It may well be that, in the instant case, the Government's
surveillance of [defendant’s] conversations was a reasonable
one which readily would have gained prior judicial approval.
. . . The Fourth Amendment contemplates a prior judicial
judgment, not the risk that executive discretion may be
reasonably exercised. . . . The independent check upon
executive discretion is not satisfied, as the Government
argues, by extremely limited post-surveillance judicial
review. Indeed, post-surveillance review would never reach
the surveillances which failed to result in prosecutions.
Prior review by a neutral and detached magistrate is the
time-tested means of effectuating Fourth Amendment
rights.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
362. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (2012) with id. § 2518(1)(b).
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requirements. Undercutting this reading of the statute,
however, is that the same “full and complete statement”
standard applies to the warrant extension provisions of §
2518(1)(e).363 The Supreme Court has already indicated that
including facts obtained from previous electronic surveillance
in an extension application is a substantive provision—i.e., it is
central to the statutory purpose.364 Perhaps a stronger
structural argument can be made for applying a Franks
analysis to the necessity requirement by looking at § 2518(3).365
This subsection provides that upon a wiretap application, a
judge may issue an ex parte order only where the judge finds,
based on the facts submitted, that:
(a) there is probable cause for belief that an
individual is committing, has committed, or is
about to commit a particular offense enumerated
in section 2516 of this chapter;
(b) there is probable cause for belief that
particular communications concerning that
offense will be obtained through such
interception;
(c) normal investigative procedures have been
tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be
unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too
dangerous;
(d) except [in the case of a “roving” wiretap],
there is probable cause for belief that the
facilities from which, or the place where, the
wire, oral, or electronic communications are to be
intercepted are being used, or are about to be
used, in connection with the commission of such
offense, or are leased to, listed in the name of, or
commonly used by such person.366
Here, the necessity requirement is on the same footing as the
363.
364.
365.
366.

See id. § 2518(1)(e).
See Giordano, 416 U.S. at 533.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3).
18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a)-(d).
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constitutional
requirements
of
probable
cause
and
particularity. However, as noted earlier, Title III actually has
greater particularity requirements than under the Fourth
Amendment.367 Both of these above interpretative arguments
are also vitiated by the underlying purpose of each statutory
requirement. As explained above, the probable cause
requirement was meant to maintain the status quo, while the
necessity requirement was meant to afford greater protection
to privacy interest.368
Courts have also been quick to note that “it is not [a
court’s] province to engage in de novo review of a[] [warrant]
application; instead, we test it in a practical and commonsense
manner to determine whether the facts which it sets forth are
minimally adequate to support the findings made by the
issuing judge.”369 This is certainly correct; a determination of
wiretap necessity is analogous to a factual finding that
reviewing courts are apprehensive to second-guess. Therefore,
a court should not lightly overturn an issuing judge’s
determination that “necessity” is present in a given case. This
does not mean, however, that a court should abstain from
deciding whether or not an issuing judge’s decision was based
on misleading or incomplete information. It also does not mean
that a reviewing court should give similarly greater discretion
where a judge’s determination is made on the basis of this
misleading or incomplete data. As the Sixth Circuit succinctly
put it:
Generally, in reviewing the validity of an
electronic surveillance order, we will accord great
deference to the determinations of the issuing
judge. However, this deference does not logically
apply where the issuing judge is given
misleading
information
in
the
wiretap

367. See generally supra Part III.
368. See supra notes 329-46 and accompanying text.
369. See United States v. Cole, 807 F.2d 262, 268 (1st Cir. 1986)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also United States v.
Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 231 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Scibelli,
549 F.2d 222, 226 (1st Cir. 1977) (collecting cases)), abrogation recognized by
United States v. Al Jaber, 436 F. App’x 9, 12 (2d Cir. 2011).
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application or supporting affidavits.370
Taking all of this into consideration, courts should adopt a
more stringent standard to appropriately protect against abuse
of the wiretap application process. An appropriate standard
would in some sense look similar to a Franks analysis, but it
would stop short of requiring a showing that the omitted or
misstated fact was material, which essentially shifts the
burden to the defendant to disprove necessity. Once a
defendant has presented specific, articulable reasons to cast
doubt on the veracity of the facts used to establish necessity in
the government’s application, a Franks-type evidentiary
hearing should be granted.
At this stage, the defendant challenging the wiretap
application should have the burden to come forward with
sufficient evidence to justify a hearing. Placing this initial, but
relatively light, burden on the defendant to present some
minimal level of proof of falsity prevents courts from going on
endless, unfruitful excursions into government investigations.
It therefore takes into account considerations of judicial
efficiency. Based on policies underlying the Fourth
Amendment, a wiretap warrant is generally presumed valid.371
370. United States v. Rice, 478 F.3d 704, 709 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Cf. United States v. Canfield, 212
F.3d 713, 717 (2d Cir. 2000) (“In this situation, the issuing judge’s probable
cause determination is not due any deference because he did not have an
opportunity to assess the affidavit without the inaccuracies.”).
371. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978); see also United
States v. Zapata, Nos. 96-1457, 97-1013, 96-1536, 96-1573, 1998 WL 681311,
at *2 (2d Cir. Jan. 30, 1998) (“Wiretap orders are presumed valid . . . .”). Cf.
United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 316-17 (1972).
There, the court stated:
These Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly be
guaranteed if domestic security surveillances may be
conducted solely within the discretion of the Executive
Branch. The Fourth Amendment does not contemplate the
executive officers of Government as neutral and
disinterested magistrates. Their duty and responsibility are
to enforce the laws, to investigate, and to prosecute. But
those charged with this investigative and prosecutorial duty
should not be the sole judges of when to utilize
constitutionally sensitive means in pursuing their tasks.
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An even stronger case for assumed validity of a warrant can be
made as it specifically relates to a wiretap warrant because of
the added layers of protection provided by Title III. By the time
a wiretap application is submitted for judicial approval, the
Attorney General or one of his or her designated officials has
already pre-approved the application, and therefore the
government has already made an internal institutional
determination that a wiretap is necessary. This pre-approval is
not required by the Fourth Amendment. This added layer of
protection gives further reason not to question the
government’s good faith absent at least some minimal evidence
to the contrary. For these reasons, a standard similar to that
required to obtain an evidentiary hearing under Franks is also
appropriate to use where a defendant challenges whether the
government has supplied a “full and complete statement”
concerning the requirement of necessity. This standard is the
following:
To mandate an evidentiary hearing, the
challenger’s attack must be more than conclusory
and must be supported by more than a mere
desire to cross-examine. There must be
allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless
disregard for the truth, and those allegations
must be accompanied by an offer of proof. They
should point out specifically the portion of the
warrant affidavit that is claimed to be false; and
they should be accompanied by a statement of
supporting reasons. Affidavits or sworn or
otherwise reliable statements of witnesses
should be furnished, or their absence
satisfactorily explained.372
The historical judgment, which the Fourth Amendment
accepts, is that unreviewed executive discretion may yield
too readily to pressures to obtain incriminating evidence
and overlook potential invasions of privacy and protected
speech.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
372. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 172.
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The burden at this hearing would then shift to the government
to prove by a preponderance that they had acted appropriately
and supplied a “full and complete statement” of necessity based
on all of the facts developed at that hearing.373 If after the
conclusion of the hearing the government has not met its
burden and the court determines that the government
recklessly,
knowingly,
or
intentionally
omitted
or
misrepresented pertinent facts in its affidavit, all evidence
derived from the subsequently issued wiretap should be
suppressed. Unlike the analysis under Franks, the inquiry
should end there; whether the omitted or misrepresented
information is “material” should not be considered. This
approach would place increased emphasis on appropriately
obtaining judicial approval, and it would keep the burden of
proof entirely on the government to prove that it complied with
the statutory procedures. Both of these results are more in line
with the statutory text and legislative history than is the
current status quo.
This approach would be similar (with one important
difference) to what the appellant sought in United States v.
Heilman,374 and which the Third Circuit declined to adopt.375
There, the defendant argued that a Franks analysis is
inapplicable to a wiretap challenge to the necessity
requirement, and that instead of a Franks hearing, he should
be entitled to a “necessity hearing.”376 Although not fully
defining what such a hearing would entail, the defendant
suggested that it would “include[] an inquiry into any material
misstatements or omissions regarding necessity as part of the
reviewing court’s duty to assess necessity.”377 The defendant in
Heilman argued that he should be entitled to a “necessity
hearing” simply by alleging that the government illegally

373. Even under a Franks analysis, additional information not contained
in the warrant affidavit may be used to determine the government’s state of
mind. See, e.g., United States v. Finley, 612 F.3d 998, 1003 n.7 (8th Cir.
2010).
374. 377 F. App’x 157 (3d Cir. 2010).
375. See id. at 183-84.
376. See id.
377. Id.
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searched him.378 As the Third Circuit correctly noted, however,
such a hearing should not be granted in the absence of at least
some initial showing of falsity.379

378. Id. at 184. The court articulated that:
Pursuant to § 3504, if defendants claim that evidence
against them was acquired as a result of prior, unlawful
surveillance, the Government must confirm or deny whether
that unlawful surveillance occurred. Napoli interprets the
Government’s statutory obligation to confirm or deny the
existence of the unlawful surveillance as to mandate a
necessity hearing. This interpretation, however, is
completely divorced from a plain reading of the text.
Nothing in the text indicates that defendants are entitled to
a hearing if they allege that the Government illegally
searched them by electronic means.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
379. See id. While the Third Circuit refused to decide whether Franks is
appropriate to apply to the necessity requirement, two cases from the Second
Circuit have rejected a similar argument. In United States v. Bianco, the
Second Circuit held that a Franks analysis is appropriate to apply to the
“impracticality” provision for obtaining a “roving” wiretap under Title III,
which similarly requires a “full and complete statement” on the question of
“‘why such specification [of the place where the communication is to be
intercepted] is not practical.’” United States v. Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112, 1125
(2d Cir. 1993), abrogation recognized by United States v. Galpin, No. 11-4808cr, 2013 WL 3185299, at *7 (2d Cir. June 25, 2013). The court rejected the
defendant’s argument that it “should look directly to the exclusionary rule of
the statute, rather than to focus on fourth-amendment considerations or a
Franks analysis.” Id. at 1125. In doing so, the court reasoned that the
suppression provision was “not intended ‘generally to press the scope of the
suppression role beyond [then] present search and seizure law,’” id. at 1126
(citing S. Rep. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2185;
Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 139 (1978)), and because Title III
predated Franks, applying such an analysis would actually strengthen the
protections of Title III. See Bianco, 998 F.2d at 1126. This analysis, however,
completely ignored Giordano and the legislative history indicating that the
necessity requirement was intended to provide greater protections than that
which is provided by the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Giordano,
416 U.S. 505, 526 (1974) (“[P]redecessor bills [to Title III] specified a fourth
ground for suppression—the lack of probable cause—which was omitted in
subsequent bills, apparently on the ground that it was not needed because
official interceptions without probable cause would be unlawful within the
meaning of [§ 2518(10)(a)(i)].”); see also United States v. Amanuel, 615 F.3d
117, 125-27 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that Title III suppression is more
expansive than the exclusionary rule). The Rajaratnam court also rejected
these arguments, but did so by relying on Bianco, concluding that defendants’
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In addition to being more closely aligned with the statutory
text, the “necessity hearing” approach better protects the
privacy interests at stake. As noted above, individual privacy is
harmed at the moment a private conversation is intercepted by
a third party, such as an investigating government official.380
Although this harm may be aggravated by repeating the
contents of that conversation at a later time—e.g., by playing a
recording of the intercepted conversation in open court—a
private conversation no longer remains private from the
moment another person eavesdrops or otherwise interferes.
This truth is reflected in many areas of the law. In the Fourth
Amendment context, holding a conversation with a known
third-party present will destroy one’s reasonable expectation of
privacy.381 Similarly, the attorney-client privilege is destroyed
where a third party is exposed to the contents of an attorney’s
legal advice given to his or her client.382 Privacy interests can
be protected effectively only where preventative measures are
in place; it is exceedingly difficult to protect privacy
retroactively. Congress established a number of preventative
measures when it enacted Title III, and the necessity
requirement is one of them. Therefore, it should be vigorously
enforced.
In this regard it is important to remember exactly the
privacy interests at stake. It is feasibly possible to retroactively
protect the privacy rights of each individual criminal defendant
to a limited extent. This is the very premise underlying the
exclusionary rule; an unconstitutional invasion into a private,
protected area results in suppression. A Franks analysis also
accomplishes this goal by suppressing evidence where, had the

arguments were “foreclosd by settled precedent.” United States v.
Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 151 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112).
380. See supra notes 88-89, 150 and accompanying text; see also supra
Part III.B.4.
381. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection.” (citing Lewis v. United States, 385
U.S. 206, 210 (1966); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927))).
382. See 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §
2311, at 601-03 (John T. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (attorney-client
communications in presence of third party not the agent of the attorney are
not protected by the privilege).
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government been fully truthful in its application, necessity of a
wiretap would not have been established. But, retroactive
protection of privacy rights has limitations. To begin, the
remedy of suppression cannot undo an already-completed
invasion of a person’s privacy. Instead, it merely serves as the
next best alternative—protecting against further aggravation
of the initial unlawful intrusion. Similarly, the suppression
remedy has a limited reach in terms of who it protects. Only a
criminal defendant successfully challenging the use of certain
evidence directly benefits from the exclusion of that evidence.
Others, however, indirectly benefit from suppression based on
its deterrent effect on law enforcement.
Title III is concerned with privacy interests much broader
than those represented by persons who find themselves subject
to criminal prosecution. Less than one-quarter of all authorized
wire intercepts in 2011 resulted in the discovery of
incriminating evidence.383 The vast majority of these intercepts
therefore involved innocent, non-criminal communications.
Many of these same intercepts also likely listened in on, not
just innocent conversations by suspected criminals, but also
conversations between a suspected criminal and whollyinnocent individuals. An illustrative case is United States v.
Goffer,384 another recent insider trading prosecution, where
investigators using a wiretap listened in on private marital
conversations between the defendant and his wife.385 Over the
course of a sixty day period, federal agents intercepted 180
calls between the defendant and his wife dealing “almost
exclusively with personal and family matters,” none of which
were incriminating.386 The court called the actions of federal
investigators “disgraceful” and an “unnecessary, and
apparently voyeuristic, intrusion into the [defendant and his
wife’s] private life.”387 The invasion of privacy at stake where

383. See 2011 WIRETAP REPORT, supra note 5, at 21 tbl.4. On average,
868 out of 3,716 intercepts were incriminating, which equates to an
incriminating-interception rate of 23.36%.
384. 756 F. Supp. 2d 588 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d, No. 11-3951-cr(L), 2013
WL 3285115, at *5 (2d Cir. July 1, 2013).
385. Id. at 591.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 594-595.
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the government uses wiretaps is in contrast to a more typical
Fourth Amendment violation of a person’s privacy, the
collateral consequences of which are relatively limited. For
example, a warrantless home invasion by police affects the
privacy rights of the handful of other people who may live at
the residence. A wiretap investigation spanning 30 days, on the
other hand, has the capacity to ensnare possibly dozens of
innocent people making contact with the target of the
wiretap.388 This broad threat to privacy was the very reason
Congress sought to limit the use of wiretaps beyond the
protections afforded by the Constitution. Because of the
broader scope of privacy interests at stake, the indirect benefit
of police deterrence afforded by the remedy of suppression is of
paramount importance when it comes to the covert interception
of private conversations. Thus, requiring a less demanding
standard on the defendant to suppress wiretap evidence is also
appropriate as a matter of sound policy.
At the same time, to balance appropriately privacy and
law-enforcement concerns, courts should avoid applying a
negligence standard to the government’s failure to provide a
“full and complete statement” of the facts indicating necessity.
Adopting
a
negligence
standard
to
omissions
or
misrepresentations would not further the interests of
individual privacy and would therefore be an unjustified boon
to criminal defendants. Assuming that the government
negligently omitted certain facts concerning necessity from a
wiretap application, other protections exist for individual
privacy. Most importantly, pre-application approval is required
by the Attorney General or another appropriately designated
official.389 This government official must conclude prior to
submitting a warrant application that using a wiretap is
necessary.390 Therefore, negligently or carelessly omitting or
misrepresenting certain facts in a wiretap application is more

388. See, e.g., Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 9, United States v.
Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2013) (No. 11-4416-cr), 2012 WL 389959,
at *9 (stating the warrant and renewal applications in this case spanned nine
months and “record[ed] over 2,200 private conversations between Appellant
and at least 130 of his colleagues, employees, friends, and family”).
389. See United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 528 (1974).
390. Id. at 527-28.
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analogous to Chavez, where the Supreme Court held that
improperly identifying the government official who preapproved the application does not require suppression.391
Another important consideration is that the line between
recklessness and negligence in regard to a wiretap affidavit
will often be determined by the caliber of the omitted or
misrepresented facts in the larger context of the investigation.
The Rajaratnam case again provides a poignant example.
There, the government failed to reveal that its investigation of
one of the defendants dated back to the late 1990s, which to the
district court was a “glaring” omission.392 Do to the sheer
magnitude of the omission at issue, the district court concluded
that the government had acted recklessly.393 On appeal,
however, the Second Circuit was less convinced as to the
magnitude of this omission, concluding that the government
had acted, at most, negligently.394 The Second Circuit noted
that “reckless disregard” can at times “be inferred from the
omission of critical information in a wiretap application”
because “[s]ubjective intent, after all, is often demonstrated
with objective evidence.”395 This does not mean, however, that
this inference “can be automatically drawn simply because a
reasonable person would have included the omitted
information, and the inference is particularly inappropriate
where the government comes forward with evidence indicating
that the omission resulted from nothing more than negligence,
or that the omission was the result of a considered and
reasonable judgment that the information was not necessary to
the wiretap application.”396 Thus, the size and scope of the

391. See United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 565 (1974); see also
United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 436 n.23 (1977).
392. See, e.g., United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH), 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143175, *36, 58 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010), aff’d, 719 F.3d
139 (2d Cir. 2013).
393. This consideration is distinct from the second prong of a Franks
analysis concerning materiality.
394. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 155-56 (2d Cir.
2013).
395. Id. at 154 (internal citations omitted).
396. Id.; see also United States v. Rice, 478 U.S. 704, 715-18 (2007) (Bell,
C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the Government’s omissions were merely
negligent, not reckless).
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omission are often critical considerations. Although the
government should not have to give minutely detailed
information about its investigation to obtain a wiretap
warrant, it generally must give a broad and comprehensive
overview—i.e., “a full and complete statement”—of the
investigation. Applying a negligence standard would permit a
defendant to attack a wiretap affidavit based upon omissions
not particularly relevant to a full, inclusive determination of
necessity. This would contradict the congressional intent that a
necessity determination be made in a common sense manner.397
Therefore, a negligence standard would require specificity in a
wiretap warrant not intended by Congress.
Of course, many of these same considerations are also to
some extent inherent in the materiality determination of a
Franks analysis. Determining the line between negligence and
recklessness, however, is analytically distinct from a
materiality determination. Importantly, the focus on the
recklessness/negligence paradigm is placed on how the
government acted and what its state of mind was. These
considerations are the appropriate focus of a Title III
suppression analysis, as they place a heavier burden on the
government to act “by the book” of Title III. In contrast, the
focus of the materiality determination under the Fourth
Amendment and Franks is whether the certain intentional,
knowing, or reckless actions of the government officials were
important in the larger context of determining the
appropriateness of issuing a warrant.398
In sum, where a defendant argues that the government
failed to satisfy the necessity requirement of Title III by failing
to provide a “full and complete statement” of relevant facts,
courts should refocus their analysis on what was provided in
the wiretap affidavit itself and how the government acted.
Where the defendant can present specific and articulable
reasons to doubt the truthfulness or completeness of the
wiretap application, an evidentiary hearing should be granted.
397. See S. Rep. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2112, 2190.
398. See, e.g., United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH), 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143175, at *70 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010), aff’d, 719 F.3d 139
(2d Cir. 2013).
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The burden at this stage should be on the government to prove
that they obtained appropriate judicial pre-screening. After the
conclusion of this evidentiary hearing, if the government
cannot establish that it was thorough and honest in its wiretap
affidavit (or merely negligent) regarding the facts of its
investigation that are related to the issue of necessity, a court
should order suppression. Unlike the current standard adopted
by numerous Circuit Courts of Appeal,399 the second prong of a
Franks analysis should be disregarded. Recklessly, knowingly,
or intentionally failing to provide a “full and complete
statement” of the facts concerning necessity is enough on its
own to warrant suppression. By acting knowingly,
intentionally, or recklessly the government cannot establish
that a judge was presented with a “full and complete
statement” of facts, and therefore the government cannot
establish that Title III’s mandatory judicial screening
requirement was complied with. This standard is more in line
with congressional intent and governing Supreme Court
precedent. Equally as important, this standard better protects
individual privacy and properly rebalances this concern with
law-enforcement interests.
VI. Conclusion
As a number of recent white-collar criminal prosecutions
indicate, the privacy interests that Congress sought to protect
by adopting a comprehensive scheme for obtaining a wiretap
warrant are becoming increasingly at risk. By weakening the
standard needed to obtain a wiretap and to subsequently use
this evidence during a later prosecution, courts have
encouraged the increased use of wiretaps. This is in stark
contrast to the role Congress originally intended the courts to
play in restricting the use of wiretaps to appropriate cases. A
return to a more serious enforcement regime for Title III’s
restrictive, substantive provisions will more adequately protect
the privacy of innocent individuals.
Recent trends show that prosecutors are poised to use
wiretaps in the investigation of nearly any white-collar crime,
399. See supra note 275-77 and accompanying text.
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regardless of whether these crimes are generally subject to
wiretap investigations under Title III. Similarly, a review of
cases shows that courts have been ignoring the specifically
provided suppression provisions of Title III in favor of a
constitutionally-based approach when determining whether to
suppress fruits of a wiretap warrant for failing the necessity
requirement. Both of these trends encourage prosecutors to
abuse the wiretap application process. Increased wiretap use in
turn causes an increase in the number of innocent individuals
who will have their conversations intercepted by government
officials. These dangers have long been recognized. As Justice
Brandeis declared in his Olmstead dissent, “writs of assistance
and general warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny and
oppression when compared with wire tapping.”400
Two important changes are needed to rebalance the
privacy interests Congress originally intended to protect in
enacting the warrant application procedures of Title III. First,
there must be stronger restrictions placed on the use of the
plain-view exception to the predicate offense requirement.
There are a number of ways to accomplish this. Courts could
reassert their supervisory role over government investigators
engaging in covert electronic surveillance in part by restricting
the time the government has to submit a subsequent
application to use “plain view” evidence at trial. Ultimately,
however, this approach is unlikely to be successful. A more
reasonable approach would be to develop a procedure for a
criminal defendant to challenge the government’s assertion of
good faith use of this exception. Permitting an evidentiary
hearing once the defendant has made some minimal showing
that challenges the government’s good faith or adopting a
burden-shifting analysis are both appropriate means to
accomplish this end. Next, courts should more strictly enforce
the necessity requirement of Title III by placing increased
importance on knowledgeable judicial pre-approval. The
constitutional standard of Franks v. Delaware should be
rejected in favor of a statutorily-based analysis more in line
with United States v. Giordano and its progeny. The focus of

400. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 476 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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this analysis should be on whether the government has
satisfied its obligation to provide a “full and complete
statement” of facts showing that a wiretap is necessary. With
these changes courts can reverse the trend toward expanded
wiretap use.
In a modern world that is becoming increasingly reliant on
social media, protecting the privacy of individuals is becoming
a steeper uphill battle. Many have become complacent about
privacy concerns due to their use—and their family and
friends’ use—of social media such as Facebook, Twitter, Gmail,
YouTube, etc. Social media outlets such as these have
increasingly opened up people’s lives to others. Although there
are undoubtedly benefits to this increased connectivity, some
are slowly starting to become aware of the dangers associated
with it as well. For example, several states have recently
passed legislation prohibiting prospective employers from
asking interviewees for their Facebook passwords.401 As
technology advances, however, we should not lose sight of older
methods of communication, such as the telephone, and the
risks posed to individual privacy when the government
surreptitiously intercepts these communications.
A job candidate is undoubtedly more sympathetic than an
accused criminal defendant. Many would argue that there
should be no privacy rights for those engaging in a criminal
enterprise. Whether or not this is true, the privacy interests at
stake extend far beyond the rights of those subject to criminal
prosecution. Wiretaps have the ability to intercept
conversations from dozens of innocent individuals. It is
therefore important not to lose the forest for the trees. The
unsympathetic nature of fallen Wall Street insiders should not
interfere with a dogged adherence to the pursuit of protecting

401. See Ed Yohnka, Another State Acts to Protect Facebook Passwords
from
Employers,
ACLU.ORG,
(Aug.
3,
2012,
1:24
PM),
http://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty/another-state-acts-protectfacebook-passwords-employers; Steven Greenhouse, Even if it Enrages Your
Boss, Social Net Speech is Protected, N.Y. TIMES, January 22, 2013, at A1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/22/technology/employers-socialmedia-policies-come-under-regulatory-scrutiny.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
(“On Jan. 1, California and Illinois became the fifth and sixth states to bar
companies from asking employees or job applicants for their social network
passwords.”).
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individual privacy more broadly. As Chief Justice Warren
succinctly observed fifty years ago: “[T]he fantastic advances in
the field of electronic communication constitute a great danger
to the privacy of the individual.”402 Perhaps this is true now
more than ever.

402. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 441 (1963) (Warren, C.J.,
concurring).
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